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I. INTRODUCTION
And the law-that rule of action which touches all human things-must
touch also this thing of death. It is not surprising that the law relating to this
mystery of what death leaves behind cannot be precisely brought within the
letter of all the rules regarding corn, lumber and pig iron. And yet the body
must be buried or disposed of. If buried, it must be carried to the place of
burial. And the law, in its all-sufficiency, must furnish some rule, by legisla-
tive enactment or analogy, or based on some sound legal principles, by which
to determine between the living questions of the disposition of the dead and
rights surrounding their bodies. In doing this the courts will not close their
eyes to the customs and necessities of civilization in dealing with the dead
and those sentiments connected with decently disposing of the remains of the
department which furnish one ground of difference between men and brutes.'
Replete with analogies drawn to war crimes and expressed
fears that the progress of medical science would be halted, the de-
bate over the ethics of human experimentation is nothing if not
complex. Nevertheless, in 1978 The Belmont Report was at least
able to identify certain generalized ethical principles to guide re-
searchers: "respect for persons," "beneficence," and "justice."
'2
1. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Wilson, 132 Ga. 62, 63-64, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (1905).
2. THE NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SuJEaC'rs OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVORIAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4-10 (1978). For the purposes of The Belmont
Report, the phrase "respect for persons" incorporated two basic ethical convictions: "first,
that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that persons with
diminished autonomy are entitled to protection." Id. at 4. The term "beneficence," often
understood to cover acts of a charitable nature, described a two-pronged obligation: "(1) do
not harm, and (2) maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms." Id. at 6. "Jus-
tice" encompassed several formulations for the purposes of distributing burdens and bene-
[Vol. 39:419
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These ethical principles, however, are based ultimately on our per-
ceptions of humanity and personality. Applying these principles to
research on fetuses or embryos is fraught with difficulty. Neither of
our pluralistic societies has resolved the "separate" debate regard-
ing the appropriate status afforded pre-viable human forms. More-
over, The Belmont Report guidelines for the performance of
human experimentation,3 such as the informed consent of the re-
search subject, are factually inappropriate in a pre-viable context.
Somewhat distinct from the ethical debate whether fetal or
embryo experimentation should be permitted" is the general recog-
nition that most current medical research is conducted responsibly.
Dead fetuses are being used not to make soap,5 but rather for valu-
able research into virology,6 cancer, arterial degenerative disease,
immunology, congenital deformities,7 and the effects of maternally
ingested drugs.8 Live fetuses in utero are studied with a view to-
ward facilitating fetal treatment,9 and while research on pre-viable
fetuses ex utero is comparatively rare,10 various metabolic studies
have been performed.1
fits: "(1) to each person an equal share, (2) to each person according to individual need,
(3) to each person according to individual effort, (4) to each person according to societal
contribution, and (5) to each person according to merit." Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 10-20.
4. For a discussion of the ethical debate, see THE NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
RESEARCH ON THE FETUS]; G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION 198-200 (1977); R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
197-202 (1981); Grobstein, The Moral Uses of 'Spare' Embryos, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5
(1982); Jones, Research on Human Embryos: The Ethics of Pragmatism, 1 PROF. NEGL. 19
(1985); Parkin, Research on Human Embryos: A Search for Principle, 1 PROF. NEGL. 164
(1985); Tiefel, The Cost of Fetal Research: Ethical Considerations, 294 NEW ENG. J. MED.
85 (1976); Walters, Ethical Issues in Experimentation on the Human Fetus, 2 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 33 (1974); Comment, Social Values in a Brave New World: Toward a Public Policy
Regarding Embryo Status and In Vitro Fertilization, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 817, 830-33 (1985);
see also P. RAMSEY, THE ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH (1975); Hellegers, Fetal Research, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 489, 491-92 (Reich ed. 1978).
5. See, e.g., C. FRANCOME, ABORTION FREEDOM 165-68 (1984) (discussing allegations
made in the English press).
6. See Editorial, The Use of Human Fetal Material for Research, 40 MEDICO-LEGAL J.
75, 75 (1972) (discussing the use of fetuses to research the production of the poliomyelitis
vaccine).
7. See generally THE USE OF FETUSES AND FETAL MATERIAL FOR RESEARCH, REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY GROUP §§ 7-14 app. 2 (H.M.S.O. 1972) (Chairman Sir John Peel) [hereinafter
cited as PEEL or THE PEEL REPORT].
8. See RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 4, at 10-12.
9. See id. at 7.
10. Id. at 14-15.
11. PEEL, supra note 7, § 16; RESEARCH ON THE FETus, supra note 4, at 12-14.
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The purpose of this Article is to detail aspects of the current
regulatory treatment by England and the United States of prenatal
life forms pertaining to disposal, possession, and research; to illus-
trate the legal difficulties encountered in attempting such regula-
tion; and to question aspects of the models so far employed.
II. EXPERIMENTATION, DISPOSAL, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE
The abortion laws of England 12 and the United States possess
one important commonality; in practice the laws are very liberal.'3
They differ markedly, however, in their juridical basis and juris-
prudential approach. Relying on Roe v. Wade14 and its progeny,
United States courts have struck down state criminal abortion
statutes because a woman, in consultation with her physician, has
a right to terminate her pregnancy protected by, and derived from,
a right of privacy founded in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. English law, lacking as it does any hierarchical
normative structure,15 has instead proceeded with a structured,
statutory decriminalization of existing prohibitions.
6
The two systems also differ in their jurisprudential approach.
The United States Supreme Court consistently has described a wo-
man's termination decision as a "fundamental right,"' 7 albeit one
subject to compelling state interests in maternal health after the
12. The limitation of the scope of this Article to English law is due to the limited
jurisdictional reach of some of the English statutes herein considered. For example, the
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, ch. 28, does not apply to Scotland (al-
though the common-law position there is similar); the Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 82, does not
apply to Northern Ireland; and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch.
34, does not apply to Scotland or Northern Ireland.
13. For a general perspective, see Cook & Dickens, A Decade of International Change
in Abortion Law: 1967-1977, 68 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 637 (1978); Veitch & Tracey, Abortion
in the Common Law World, 22 Am. J. Comp. L. 652 (1974).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. It should be remembered that although the United Kingdom is bound by the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (European Convention) as a matter of international
law, the convention has not been incorporated formally into domestic English law. For Eu-
ropean Convention cases involving abortion issues, see Bruggemann & Scheuten v. Federal
Republic of Ger., 1978 Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights)
(basic abortion rights); Paton v. United Kingdom, 3 E.H.R.R. 408 (E.C.H.R. 1980) (no
spousal veto of woman's termination decision).
16. The basic criminal provisions are found in the Offences Against the Person Act,
1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, §§ 58, 59. Decriminalization was initiated by Macnaughten, J.,
in the well-known case of The King v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687, and was completed by the
Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87.
17. E.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 452 U.S. 416,
420 n.1 (1983).
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first trimester' and in prenatal life after viability. 9 The English
Abortion Act20 makes no such broad pronouncement. Rather, Eng-
lish law has sought to "medicalize" the abortion issue by making
the abortion decision dependent upon medical discretion and the
application of statutorily mandated clinical criteria.2' Nevertheless,
the two abortion laws are identical in their practical effects; both
laws permit abortion on demand up to the end of the second tri-
mester 22 and limit the performance of third trimester abortions to
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
19. Id. Viability is the developmental stage at which the fetus "has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id.
20. The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87.
21. The Abortion Act provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence
under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered med-
ical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in
good faith-
(a) That the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the
pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such a risk of
injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, ac-
count may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable
environment.
(3) Except as provided by subsection (4) of this section, any treatment for the termina-
tion of pregnancy must be carried out in a hospital vested in the Minister of Health or
the Secretary of State under the National Health Service Acts, or in a place for the
time being approved for the purposes of this section by the said Minister or the Secre-
tary of State.
(4) Subsection (3) of this section, and so much of subsection (1) as relates to the opin-
ion of two registered medical practitioners, shall not apply to the termination of a preg-
nancy by a registered medical practitioner in a case where he is of the opinion, formed
in good faith, that the termination is immediately necessary to save the life or to pre-
vent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.
Id. § 1. This Act bears an obvious similarity to the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (United States law). This position obtains
in England for two reasons. First, § 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act, although ostensibly con-
cerned with therapeutic abortions, permits some forms of contraceptive abortions because
the medical practitioners may consider the risk of injury to the woman's "mental health"
and to her "existing children." The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, § 1(1)(a). Further, in assess-
ing mental health the medical practitioners also may consider "the pregnant woman's actual
or reasonably foreseeable environment." Id. § 1(2). Second, the balancing test central to
§ 1(1)(a) requires a comparison of the risks of the continuation of the pregnancy with its
termination. Because more maternal deaths occur from childbirth than early abortions, see
figures provided by the Under Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Secur-
ity, quoted in 1 FAM. L. 167 (1971); cf. Mortality from Abortion and Childbirth, 250 J.
A.M.A. 361 (1983) (letter to editor), any abortion decision may be justified on purely statis-
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maternal-health-preserving situations.23
As the central themes of this Article are considered, it is im-
portant to note that neither of these liberal abortion laws is neces-
sarily incompatible with extensive legal protection for the fetus or
embryo. The potential for this incompatibility has been far more
pronounced in the United States because Roe v. Wade held that a
fetus was not a person within the protection of the fourteenth
amendment.24 Yet, when the Missouri Supreme Court was asked to
construe the term "person" in a wrongful death statute to include
a fetus, the court encountered little difficulty in reaching the con-
clusion that "Roe v. Wade, while holding that the fetus is not a
'person' for purposes of the 14th amendment, does not mandate
the conclusion that the fetus is a legal nonentity.
25
In fact, most juridical decisions to legalize abortion have a
comparatively narrow effect.2 1 As one commentator has noted of
the position in the United States:
[I]t is important to understand that [Roe v. Wade] says very little about the
legal status and rights of the fetus. The issue in Roe v. Wade was whether a
state has the constitutional power to interfere with the decision of a woman,
in consultation with her physician, to have an abortion performed. The Su-
preme Court's decision was, therefore, solely in the context of the clash of
inteiests between the power of the state to prohibit abortion and the right of
a woman to have an abortion. The interests and rights of the fetus were not
directly in issue.27
In any event, it is clear that the liberalization of abortion has
not slowed the growth of legal protection afforded the fetus on ei-
tical grounds.
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). English law is slightly more restrictive
in that, irrespective of the decriminalizing effects of the Abortion Act, the still extant Infant
Life (Preservation) Act prohibits postviability terminations except "for the purpose only of
preserving the life of the mother." Infant Life Preservation Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34,
§ 1-(1). In practice, of course, such late abortions are rare, which is one reason why many
states have not taken up the Supreme Court's offered regulatory power.
24. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
25. O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983).
26. See generally Cook & Dickens, supra note 13; Veitch & Tracey, supra note 13.
27. Green, The Fetus and the Law, in GEzNxrics AND THE LAW 19, 20 (1976); see also
Veitch & Tracey, supra note 13, at 692-95 (1974); cf. Hughes, England's Great Leap Back-
ward-The Abortion Act, 1967, 43 AusTL. L.J. 12, 18-19 (1969); Note, Constitutional
Law-The "Aborted" Evolution of Fetal Rights After Roe v. Wade-Douglas v. Town of
Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982), 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 535 (1983). For a
philosophical inquiry into the fetal rights/abortion "paradox," see Campbell & McKay, An-
tenatal Injury and the Rights of the Fetus, PHm Q., Jan. 1978, at 17; see also Comment,
The Unborn: Common Law Consequences of Being a "Non-Person", 72/73 LAW & JusT. 6
(Hilary/Easter 1982).
[Vol. 39:419424
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ther side of the Atlantic.2" One may speculate that in the United
States this paradox has been facilitated by a ready acceptance of a
functional approach to legal analysis.29 In England, an apparent
failure even to consider the potential for overlap between law and
the protection of the fetus seems at least partly responsible for the
present uncertain state of the law.
Fetal and embryo research are obviously embroiled in the
abortion debate. To an extent, this is appropriate because both
subjects involve similarly difficult ethical and philosophical ques-
tions, regarding both our response to the indicia of life3 0 and our
legal definition of personhood.3 1 Yet, beyond that similarity, the
link between abortion and experimentation may have been pro-
moted by a public perception that liberal abortion laws create a
ready supply of fetuses for experimentation. 2 Further, the ques-
tion of fetal research has provided issues for the anti-abortionists,
debatable in both political and legal arenas, which have not been
28. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983) (Missouri's wrongful
death statute, which applies to the death of a "person," interpreted to be applicable to
death of a fetus in spite of ruling in Roe v. Wade that fetus is not a "person" for the pur-
poses of the 14th amendment); the enactment in England of the Congenital Disabilities
(Civil Liability) Act, 1976.
29. Consider the seminal work of Felix Cohen discussing the manipulation of legal
words and doctrines to achieve a particular result. E.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935).
30. For example, according to one commentator, "The fetus may not be a person in
the legal sense, but common sense and common dignity elevate it above the status of a
gallbladder. The potential of a gallbladder is to become an older gallbladder, whereas the
fetus has the potential to become a person." Nathan, Fetal Research: An Investigator's
View, 22 VILL. L. REV. 384, 390 (1976-77).
31. The issue of personhood arises in the context of in vitro fertilization because the
group "Americans United for Life" believes that an in vitro embryo is a person, and the
organization opposes embryo experimentation. See Gustatis, Genetic Engineering is Making
the Fetus/Person Line Harder to See, L.A. Daily J., Mar. 24, 1983, at 4, col. 3. See gener-
ally Baron, If You Prick Us, Do We Not Bleed?: Of Shylock, Fetuses, and the Concept of
Person in the Law, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 52 (1983); Tuchler, Man-Made Man and
the Law, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 310, 320-24 (1978).
32. One commentator argues that this perception is unsound. See Levine, The Impact
on Fetal Research of the Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 22 VILL. L. REV. 367, 369-70 (1976-77)
(arguing first, that there was an adequate supply of fetuses for research before Roe v. Wade
and second, that a liberal abortion law possibly decreases the supply of appropriate fetuses
because it tends to encourage earlier abortions). In England, the Medical Research Council
has funded the collection of fetuses for research since 1958, nine years before full
decriminalization of abortion. THE PEEL REPORT, supra note 7, § 17. For the scientist's per-
spective on whether to use the products of natural or induced abortion, see Miller & Poland,
Monitoring of Human Embryonic and Fetal Wastage, in MONITORING BIRTH DEFECTS AND
ENVIRONMENT 65, 70-73 (1971).
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foreclosed by the liberalization of abortion laws.33 Just as the post-
Roe v. Wade litigation concentrated on the issue of public funding
for abortions, 4 so also may the debate over prenatal research be
seen as the product of strategic ground-shifting by those opposed
to abortion" to keep abortion issues before the courts and
legislatures.
III. FETUSES AND FETAL MATERIALS: DISPOSAL
At common law the state's interest in cadaver disposal was
limited to concerns based on public health. Thus, in a case con-
cerning the less than orthodox burial of a premature infant that
had survived for only two weeks, one court stated:
The custom of the country imposed upon appellant only the duty of decently
burying his child; that is, it must be properly clothed when being taken to the
place of burial, and then placed in the ground or tomb, so that it will not
become offensive or injurious to the lives of others. He may not cast it into
the street, or into a running stream, or into a hole in the ground, or make any
disposition of it that might be regarded as creating a nuisance, be offensive to
33. See Nathan, supra note 30, at 388.
34. In England, according to the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE WORKING OF THE
ABORTION ACT CONT. 5579, § 398 (1974) (Chairperson Mrs. Justice Lane) [hereinafter cited
as LANE], the Secretary of State has a statutory duty to provide publicly funded abortion
services under the National Health Service Act, 1977, ch. 49, § 3(1). In the United States the
situation is far more complicated. Not only are free medical services extremely limited, they
are funded by both state and federal governments. Thus, a state may have a medical assis-
tance program providing medical funding, for example, to the "categorically needy" or
"medically needy." See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 414.032 (1985). Further, such a program then
may qualify that state as a participating state for partial funding of the program under
subchapter XIX of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p (1982). Litigation in the United States has
concentrated on three issues: first, the extent to which a state must provide financial assis-
tance for abortions as a condition of federal Medicaid participation; see Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977); see also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); second, the extent of the power of
the federal government to curtail Medicaid funding of abortion; see Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 2907 (1980); see also Georgia v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1293 (11th Cir. 1985) (Health De-
partment cannot be compelled to reimburse state for cost of abortions during period that
state was compelled by federal court injunction to fund procedures prior to Harris v. Mc-
Rae); cf. National Educ. Ass'n of R.I. v. Garrahy, 598 F. Supp. 1374 (D.R.I. 1984) (statutes
prohibiting private health insurers from including abortion coverage in basic medical insur-
ance and prohibiting municipalities from providing coverage at all held unconstitutional);
third, the extent to which a state may limit its own medical assistance program in the abor-
tion context; e.g. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625
P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Cory, 132
Cal. App. 3d 852, 183 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1982); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 382 Mass.
629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources, 63 Or. App. 41, 663 P.2d
1247 (1983).
35. See Nathan, supra note 30, at 387; see also Culliton, Fetal Research: The Case
History of a Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 237 (1975).
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the sense of decency, or be injurious to the health of the community."'
Of course, the question that arises is the extent to which the state
should regulate fetal disposal beyond the public health
considerations.
A. Disposal-Specific Legislation
Several American states have addressed the question of the
disposal of fetal remains. In Arkansas the law places a duty on the
physician-abortionist to "insure that the fetal remains and all
parts thereof are disposed of in a fashion similar to that in which
other tissue is disposed. 3 7 A Florida statute requires that "[fletal
remains shall be disposed of in a sanitary and appropriate manner
and in accordance with standard health practices, as provided by
rule of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services."a
Finally, California law provides that following fetal experimenta-
tion 9 "fetal remains shall be promptly interred or disposed of by
incineration.1
40
In general the specific disposal requirements of these statutes
36. Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 498, 502, 149 S.W. 871, 873 (1912).
37. ARm. STAT. ANN. § 82-436 (Supp. 1985); see also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4162
(McKinney 1985).
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(7) (West Supp. 1985).
39. Fetal experimentation is considered infra at text accompanying notes 143-269.
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25957(a) (West 1984). Subsection (b) contains an
exception for educational institutions. In 1982, 16,500 fetuses were discovered in a repos-
sessed container in Santa Monica, California. These abortuses had been stored, preparatory
to disposal, under the terms of the California statute, by a pathology laboratory under con-
tracts with various clinics and hospitals. Originally the Los Angeles County District Attor-
ney had been in favor of continuing the storage of the fetuses because of their possible
evidentiary value in prosecutions for illegal abortion. However, he agreed to have them bur-
ied or stored at a private cemetery, knowing that a Californian pro-life organization would
hold a religious service and erect a memorial plaque there. A pro-choice group brought suit
against the District Attorney and the pro-life organization. The trial court's order that the
religious burial could continue was overturned by the appellate court on the basis that the
District Attorney's entanglement with a particular religious preference violated the state
constitution's establishment clause. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Philibosian, 157
Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918, hearing denied, 688 P.2d 160, 207 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Cal.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1752 (1985). Subsequently the California Superior Court
(O'Brian, J.) gave the state permission to dispose of the fetuses "without becoming involved
in any religious ceremony or activity." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 7, 1985, at 13A, col. 6.
The Superior Court subsequently reaffirmed its decision. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 15,
1985, at 13A, col. 1. On October 6, 1985, the fetuses were given a nonreligious burial. Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan sent a eulogy, which was read at the funeral. He stated, "I am confi-
dent that your memorial service will touch many others as you proclaim the inviolability of
human life at every stage of development. From these innocent dead, let us take increased
devotion to the cause of restoring the rights of the unborn." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 7,
1985, at 8A, col. 1.
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do not seem to be problematic.4' In City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc.,42 however, the United States Su-
preme Court was faced with an ordinance that provided, "Any
physician who shall perform or induce an abortion upon a preg-
nant woman shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are
disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner. ' '4 Conscious, no
doubt, of the state's inherent power to regulate matters of public
health,44 the Court noted that the city had a "legitimate interest in
proper disposal of fetal remains. '45 The Court, however, struck
down the ordinance as impermissibly vague nonetheless because it
was unclear whether the provision merely precluded "mindless
dumping of aborted fetuses on garbage piles, ' 46 or went so far as
"to mandate some sort of 'decent burial' of an embryo at the earli-
est stages of formation.
'47
Further, it is possible that even a nonvague fetal disposal stat-
ute could be struck down if it required state interference with the
disposal process that would burden or otherwise chill a woman's
constitutionally protected decision to terminate her pregnancy.48
This was precisely the approach taken by a district court in invali-
dating two versions of Louisiana's fetal disposal statute. The origi-
nal 1978 statute stated:
Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant wo-
man shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a
manner consistent with the disposal of other human remains [viz, shall be
decently interred or cremated within a reasonable time after death].'
9
The district court struck down the statute, finding that it imposed
41. Cf. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1983) (upholding
a Missouri statute providing for the pathological examination of aborted fetal remains).
Similar provisions exist in other states. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-32 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-309 (1978).
42. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
43. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINAN ES ch. 1870, § 1870.16 (1978), quoted in City of
Akron, 462 U.S. at 424 n.7.
44. See Wyeth v. Thomas, 200 Mass. 474, 479, 86 N.E. 925, 927 (1909) ("Of [the
state's] power to exercise complete control of burials of the dead, so far as is necessary for
the protection of the public health and the promotion of the public safety, there is no
question.").
45. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 n.45.
46. Id. at 451 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 573
(E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mer. sub. nom. Frankin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976)).
47. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 451 (quoting the Sixth Circuit's opinion in the same
case, 651 F.2d 1198, 1211 (6th Cir. 1981)).
48. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 573.
49. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.14 (West Supp. 1979) (incorporating by reference
the burial provisions contained in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8:651 (West Supp. 1979)).
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two impermissible psychological burdens on the pregnant woman
concerning her abortion decision. 50 First, the statute equated the
disposal of a fetus to that of a person.5 1 Second, through the stat-
ute's referential incorporation of a portion of the Louisiana burial
statute, it forced the woman to consider whether her abortus
should be cremated or buried.52
In 1980 the Louisiana legislature responded with a new fetal
disposal statute providing:
A. Each physician who performs or induces an abortion which does not result
in a live birth shall insure that the remains of the child are disposed of in
accordance with rules and regulations which shall be adopted by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Resources.
B. The provisions of this Section shall not apply to, and shall not preclude,
instances in which the remains of the child are provided for in accordance
with the provisions of [the burial statute].
C. The attending physician shall inform each woman upon whom he performs
or induces an abortion of the provisions of this Section within twenty-four
hours after the abortion is performed or induced.
53
The same district court found the revised statute to be as constitu-
tionally defective as its predecessor. 4 Specifically, the court held
that subsection (C) constituted a direct burden on a pregnant wo-
man's abortion right because information about how the abortus
would be disposed of could cause her psychological harm.5 Fur-
ther, the court viewed the duty to inform as an interference with
the doctor's discretion. 56 In response to the state's contention that
the statute was justified on the basis of sufficient state interest, the
court stated:
[Tihe Court concludes that the burdens imposed by [the statute] are not out-
weighed by any compelling state interest and are thus invalid. Indeed, the
Court finds that the requirement embodied in paragraph (C) ... furthers no
state interest whatsoever. Women who desire the burial or cremation of fetal
remains may request such disposal if they so choose. The sole purpose of this
50. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
51. Id. at 222.
52. Id.
53. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.14 (West Supp. 1986).
54. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984). The court's opinion clearly
suggests that the entire provision was invalid. Id. at 670-71. However, the opinion only di-
rectly addresses the constitutionality of the apparently severable subsection (C). Further,
the constitutionality of subsection (A), aside from its arguably impermissible equation of
"child" (human being) with fetus, would depend on the substance of the regulations
adopted by the specified department; yet these were not considered by the court. Id. at 668.
As to subsection (B), the court suggested an interpretation that would preserve its constitu-
tionality. Id. at 669 n.27.
55. Id. at 670-71.
56. Id. at 671.
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statute is to deter women from obtaining abortions by equating the fetus to a
human life thereby making the abortion decision psychologically more
disturbing.
57
In England the burial of a dead, post-viable fetus5 s is not per-
mitted without notification to59 and permission of"' the registrar of
births, deaths, and marriages, or when appropriate, the coroner."1
Neither the Abortion Act, 1967 nor any other provision of English
law 2 expressly provides for the manner of disposal of an aborted
fetus. The 1974 report of the Lane Committee, however, recom-
mended that appropriate measures be taken to minimize distress
to nursing and other hospital staff.6 3 This proposal was promoted
no doubt by the Lane survey of hospital boards and hospitals on
the then current practices regarding the disposal of fetuses and fe-
tal material. The study had shown that incineration was the most
commonly used disposal technique, although large fetuses often
were made available for research. 4
B. Disposal-Indirect Regulation
In England the concealment of the birth of a fetus is a crime
under the Offences Against the Person Act, 5 and concealment of
the performance of a decriminalized abortion constitutes a breach
of the Abortion Act's notification provisions. 6 In America there
57. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
58. Specifically, the statute refers to the burial of a still-born child as defined in § 41
of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 20, § 41.
59. Id. § 11. The registrar then must report to the coroner a death that he believes
might have been caused by an abortion. See The Registration of Births, Death and Mar-
riages Regulations 1968, STAT. INST. 1968 No. 2049, Reg. 51(1)(e).
60. See generally the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 48,
§ 5. This would seem to be the reason behind the hospital policy, as discovered by LANE,
supra note 34, at app. to § K, of sending aborted, viable fetuses to the mortuary and treat-
ing them as still-births. See generally 10 HALSBuRY'S LAW OF ENGLAND § 1028 (4th ed. 1975
& Supp. 1984). The rules as to cremation are slightly different. Id. § 1046.
61. In general terms these requirements are similar to the special fetal death registra-
tion provisions found in some United States jurisdictions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 382.071 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-260 (1985); IND. STATS. ANN. §§ 16-1-
17-1 to 16-1-17-5 (Burns 1983); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4160-61 (McKinney 1985); O.
REV. STAT. § 432.333 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-16 (1977).
62. Cf. Gilbert v. Buzzard, 161 Eng. Rep. 1342 (Consistory Court of London 1820)
(ecclesiastical law regulating manner of burial of corpse). For a historical treatment of the
English commonlaw with regard to corpses, see Louisville & N.R.R. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62,
64, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (1905).
63. LANE, supra note 34, § 319.
64. Id. § K app.
65. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 60.
66. Abortion Act, 1967, § 2; The Abortion Regulations 1968, STAT. INST. 1968 No. 390,
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are state criminal provisions that prohibit the concealment of a
death67 or a dead body. 8 Further, if the purpose of that conceal-
ment (or destruction) is to prevent the holding of a lawful inquest,
an additional English common-law crime is committed. 9 Some
state laws regulate the reporting of lawful abortions. 70 These laws,
in general, are constitutionally sound.7'
C. Fetus Disposal and Tort Law
Particularly egregious conduct by medical staff regarding fetal
disposal following an abortion may have civil law consequences in
the United States. In one Tennessee case, 72 a woman's premature
baby died shortly after birth. Six weeks later, the woman was
shown the child floating in a gallon jar of formaldehyde. She recov-
ered actual damages for breach of a contract to properly dispose of
the baby, as well as punitive damages for the hospital's "outra-
geous conduct" ' in so displaying the body. In a recent Georgia
case,74 the defendant hospital had undertaken to dispose of the
plaintiffs' stillborn child. One month later, a hospital employee tel-
ephoned the child's mother and informed her that she could still
retrieve the child's body because it had been placed in frozen stor-
age. The appellate court held that a jury issue was presented with
regard to the plaintiffs' allegation of intentional infliction of emo-
tional harm.75 Therefore, at least in the United States, there is a
§§ 2-5.
67. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1302 (1979).
68. E.g., id. § 28-1301. For the application of the Nebraska statute to the throwing
away of the body of a newborn infant, see State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 287 N.W.2d 59
(1980).
69. The Queen v. Price, 12 Q.B.D. 247 (1884); The Queen v. Stephenson, 13 Q.B.D.
331 (1884); The King v. Purcy, 149 L.T.R. (n.s.) 432 (1933). For the correct form following
an inquest on a stillbirth, see The Corners Rules 1984, STAT. INST. 1984 No. 552, Sch. 4.
70. See, e.g., MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 33.2835(3) (1980); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
230.3(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
71. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976) (upholding
Missouri recordkeeping statute).
72. Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975); see also Hem-
bree v. Hospital Bd., 293 Ala. 160, 300 So. 2d 823 (1974) (denial of recovery due to sovereign
immunity of defendant).
73. Johnson, 527 S.W.2d at 140. A similar position may be contended for in England
because RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965), is loosely based on the English
case of Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS app. § 46(1)
(1965); see also Janvier v. Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316 (C.A.). With regard to the possibility
of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional harm, consider infra note 102.
74. McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp., 167 Ga. App. 495, 306 S.E.2d 746 (1983).
75. Id. at 499, 306 S.E.2d at 749.
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nice symmetry between tort law's liability rule for giving an
abortee psychologically damaging information and constitutional
law's prohibition on the mandating of such communication.
IV. FETUSES AND FETAL MATERIALS: POSSEsSORY RIGHTS
While there seems to be little doubt that the state may inter-
vene to regulate some aspects of the disposal of a dead fetus, the
law is far from clear with regard to any possessory rights that may
arise in the event of nondisposal.
A. Common Law Possessory Interests
Although English courts consistently have denied the exis-
tence of property rights in a corpse,7 6 there has been some recogni-
tion of the existence of protected possessory rights that vest in the
next of kin-an inevitable recognition because the common law did
not shirk from imposing correlative duties with regard to the dis-
posal of dead bodies. 77 Thus, analogizing from the cases in the bur-
ial genre,7 8 it may be argued that the refusal to deliver up a dead
fetus to its executrix-mother for burial would be both actionable
and an offense at common law. The offense also would be commit-
ted if the fetus was otherwise disposed of, such as by sale.79 Simi-
larly, an action would lie in the case of nonconsensual experimen-
tation.80 Once the mother had taken possession of the fetus, she
would be under a duty to dispose of it." If the mother did not
desire possession of the fetus, the hospital or clinic where it was
delivered would have the duty of disposal.82 After burial, the fetus,
like a dead body, would lack the characteristics of property. Its
unauthorized disinterment, however, would be prohibited at com-
mon law.83
76. See, e.g., The Queen v. Sharpe, 169 Eng. Rep. 959, 960 (1857).
77. See, e.g., The Queen v. Stewart, 113 Eng. Rep. 1007 (1840) (deceased entitled to
proper burial); see also Rees v. Hughes [1946] 1 K.B. 517 (estate of deceased liable for
burial expenses).
78. The Queen v. Vann, 169 Eng. Rep. 523 (1851); The Queen v. Hunter, [1973] 3 All
E.R. 286 (C.A.).
79. See, e.g., The King v. Cundick, 171 Eng. Rep. 900 (Surrey Assizes 1822).
80. See, e.g., Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905) (recovery for emo-
tional harm following mutilation of corpse).
81. The Queen v. Vann, 164 Eng. Rep. 523 (1851).
82. Cf. The Queen v. Stewart, 113 Eng. Rep. 1007 (1840) (person under whose roof a
pauper dies has duty to carry properly the body to place of burial).
83. See The King v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (1788); 1 L.R.Q.B. 475, 485 (1866); The
Queen v. Sharpe, 169 Eng. Rep. 959 (1857).
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American case law is essentially to the same effect. s4 Thus, it
has been stated:
There is no right of property as such in the body of a dead person although a
quasi property right to its possession has been recognized for the limited pur-
pose of determining who shall have its custody for burial. The duty to bury a
corpse and to preserve its remains is a legal right [sic] which courts of law
will recognize and protect; such right, in the absence of any testamentary
disposition, belongs exclusively to the next of kin.
85
As is the case in English law, this quasi-property right is derived
from and limited by the correlative duty of disposal imposed on
the decedent's next of kin.86 In the case of a dead fetus, the duty to
bury, and hence that possessory right, would be vested in its
parents.8 7
B. Possessory Interests in Nonburial Situations
The special problems attendant upon the still living, nonviable
fetus ex utero aside,88 it appears that Anglo-American property law
does not consider the fetus a res nullius. To the contrary, the fetus
may be the object of some entitlement allocation. 9 Traditionally,
the rough allocation of entitlements relating to the possession of a
corpse has favored a close relative for two basic reasons. First, the
public health requires the speedy burial of the corpse. Allocation of
the possessory entitlement to the relative achieves this goal with
low transaction costs90 because there is a high probability that the
84. See generally 22 AM. Jurm 2D Dead Bodies (1965 & Supp. 1985); 25A C.J.S. Dead
Bodies (1966 & Supp. 1985); H. BERNARD, THE LAW OF DEATH AND DIsPosAL OF THE DEAD 13-
21 (2d ed. 1979). A similar position also obtains in civil legal systems. See Meulders-Klein,
The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and Limits in Comparative Law, 6 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 29, 44-45 (1983).
85. Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4-5, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483-84
(1964) (citations omitted). This use of the right/duty language is, of course, enough to make
Hohfeld spin in his grave. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONs 36-38 (W.
Cook ed. 1963). For criminal enforcement of the duty to bury decently, see State v. Brad-
bury, 136 Me. 347, 9 A.2d 657 (1939).
86. Nichols v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 94 Vt. 14, 16, 109 A. 905, 906 (1919). Some states
have confirmed and elaborated on this position with legislation. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986).
87. See, e.g., Wilde v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 147 Wis. 129, 132, 132 N.W.
885, 886 (1911) (discussing parents' care and custody rights over body of their minor child);
see also Przybyszewski v. Metropolitan Dade County, 363 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
88. See the discussion infra text accompanying notes 345-53.
89. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (suggestive of much of the
terminology used herein).
90. Transaction costs in this sense refer primarily to the general societal costs involved
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relative already will have actual possession of the corpse. Further,
the imposed duty to bury will not require expensive enforcement
because the relative will have an emotional stake in expediting the
burial. Second, distributional reasons also favor this allocation; the
relatives usually will benefit from a decedent's estate, so some of
this benefit should be appropriated to cover the burial expenses.91
As has been illustrated, the public health or burial rationale
led the old common-law courts to evolve a quasi-property, posses-
sory right entitlement allocation in favor of the next of kin. The
doctrinal expression of this entitlement, however, was delineated
before the decriminalization of abortion, the growth of fetal experi-
mentation, and the fear of creating a fetus market. The contempo-
rary expression of this entitlement, therefore, lacks any functional
limitation requiring that the possession of a dead fetus be for the
purposes of burial alone. 2
These doctrinal problems were highlighted by the case of
Doodeward v. Spence,93 decided by the High Court of Australia in
1908. The subject of the dispute, a stillborn, two-headed child, had
been born in New Zealand some forty years before. The child had
been preserved by the mother's physician and subsequently came
into the possession of the plaintiff, a showman, who exhibited it for
profit. When the corpse was confiscated by the police, the plaintiff
brought an action in conversion and detinue.
The court upheld the plaintiff's cause of action for interfer-
ence with a possessory right even though the purpose of the dis-
puted possession was commercial display, not burial. The Chief
Justice stated:
In my opinion there is no law forbidding the mere possession of a human
body, whether born alive or dead, for purposes other than immediate burial.
A fortiori such possession is not unlawful if the body possesses attributes of
such a nature that its preservation may afford valuable or interesting infor-
mation or instruction. If the requirements of public health or public decency
in the transfer of possession. These costs are not coextensive with those identified by econo-
mists in the context of market transactions. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). For an example of this nontechnical usage, see Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 367-68 (1954).
91. The practical inclusion of a fetus into this entitlement regime will be difficult to
justify on this second ground because the fetus is unlikely, legally or factually, to possess an
estate. Nevertheless, the primacy of the first rationale, together with a justice-motivated
goal of treating like or roughly alike cases similarly should suffice.
92. Cf. Rauhe v. Langeland Memorial Chapel, Inc., 44 Mich. App. 371, 205 N.W.2d
313 (1973) (interpreting Michigan donation statute to be limited to burial rights).
93. 6 C.L.R. 406 (Austl. 1908).
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are infringed, quite different considerations arise.4
At common law, then, the entitlement allocation with regard to a
dead fetus may extend beyond mere possession for burial and may
encompass any possession that does not infringe on the require-
ments of public health or decency. 5
Once it has been determined that a fetus may be the subject
of some entitlement allocation, a problem arises regarding how
that entitlement may be protected. Traditionally, if this protection
is achieved through a property rule,"' then intentional tort law
may be utilized for enforcement purposes. Likewise, it has been
argued that any lesser possessory right should be enforceable in a
similar manner.
9 7
It is unclear, however, whether the actions that have been per-
mitted with regard to dead bodies actually do reflect recognition of
any genuine property, or even possessory, interest in the corpse.98
Recognition may be limited to an interest in the survivors against
the infliction of emotional distress.99 Indeed, courts seemingly have
dealt with such cases under the randomly selected rubrics of
breach of contract, 100 negligence simpliciter,101 or negligent inflic-
tion of emotional harm.102 Clearly, Doodeward v. Spence applies a
94. Id. at 413-14 (Griffith, C.J.).
95. But see the dissenting judgment of Justice Higgins, who would restrict the entitle-
ment to possession for burial. Id. at 417-24 (Higgins, J., dissenting).
96. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 89, at 1106-10.
97. Skegg, Liability for the Unauthorized Removal of Cadaveric Transplant Mate-
rial, 14 MED. Sci. L. 53, 54 (1974); see also Wilson v. Lombank Ltd., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1294
(Q.B. 1962) (trespass action protecting mere possessory interest); B. DICKENS, MEDIcO-LEGAL
ASPECTS OF FAMmY LAW 80-83 (1979).
98. See generally cases cited in PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th ed.
1984); 22 AM. Jun. 2D Dead Bodies §§ 17, 31, 43 (1965); Annots., 48 A.L.R.3d 240 and 261
(1973).
99. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Armstrong Funeral Home Ltd., [1931] 1 D.L.R. 676 (Alta.
Sup. Ct. 1930); see also Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481
(Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 186 A. 585 (N.J.
1936); Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
100. E.g., Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948) (breach of contract to
preserve corpse through embalming).
101. Hembree v. Hospital Bd., 293 Ala. 160, 300 So. 2d 823 (1974) (disposal by inciner-
ation of stillborn child without parent's consent considered claim sounding in tort, not con-
tract); Przybyszewski v. Metropolitan Dade County, 363 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (failed on facts).
102. Brooks v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 325 So. 2d 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1976) (no recovery for negligent misplacement of dead
premature baby because parent suffered no impact). Note, though, that many United States
jurisdictions now have retreated from most of these doctrinal subrules. See, e.g., Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Campbell
v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981); see also Kohn v. United
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property-type enforcement rule at common law. 10 3 The chief jus-
tice stated therein, "If one medical or scientific student may law-
fully possess it, he may transfer the possession to another," 104 and
the court was prepared to endorse this property approach by per-
mitting the utilization of intentional tort doctrine. In contrast, the
jury in Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital0 5 unwittingly reflected
the law's ambivalence about any property rule when, rather than
awarding damages for conversion of an embryo, the jury limited
recovery to the emotional harm suffered by its parents.
Concerning criminal law enforcement of these possessory
rights, it seems clear that a corpse could not be considered the sub-
ject of larceny at old common law.10 6 Today, it is unlikely that a
court would consider a fetus property within the English Theft
Act'0 7 or, for example, within the Model Penal Code.108 Although
States, 591 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (action for negligent infliction of emotional harm
permitted against U.S. Army for disposal of parts of serviceman's body contrary to his fam-
ily's religious beliefs); cf. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp. 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436
N.Y.S.2d 871, (1980) (no recovery for parents' emotional and psychic harm against drug
manufacturer and medical professionals following birth of deformed child).
103. Cf. Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 255, 115 N.E. 715, 717 (1917)
("That there is no right of property in a dead body in the ordinary acceptation of the term
is undoubtedly true when limited to a property right as understood in the commercial
sense."). Notice should also be taken of two English cases that, at first sight, seem to suggest
that the commercial disposition of a corpse, constitutes a criminal offense. The King v.
Cundick, 171 Eng. Rep. 900 (Surrey Assizes 1822); The King v. Gilles, (Northumberland
Assizes 1820), cited in The Queen v. Duffin & Marshall, 366 n.(b), 168 Eng. Rep. 847, 848
n.(b) (1818). In fact, these cases are authority only for the proposition that the sale or other
disposition of a corpse either without consent or contrary to the wishes of those with a legal
right to possession may involve criminal sanctions. See McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp., 167
Ga. App. 495, 306 S.E.2d 746 (1983) (upholding the parental contractual release of the body
of a stillborn child to a hospital).
104. 6 C.L.R. at 414. This would extend to a commercial exploiter because,
when a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a human body or
part of a human body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some attributes
differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right to retain pos-
session of it, at least as against any person not entitled to have it delivered to him for
the purpose of burial ....
Id.
105. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For a discussion of Del Zio, see infra text accompa-
nying note 288.
106. See, e.g., Doodeward v. Spence, 6 C.L.R. at 411. According to Bernard: "Because
the English law from an early date regarded the larceny of 'property' (regardless of the
monetary value of the thing stolen) as a felony, punishable for centuries by death, there was
a reluctance to regard a corpse as a subject of larceny." H. BERNARD, supra note 84, at 16.
107. Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60, § 1(1); cf. The Queen v. Rothery, 63 Crim. App. 231
(1976), interpreted in Mathews, Whose Body? People as Property, CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
193, 224 (1983); see also Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J.
142 (1977); Skegg, Human Corpses, Medical Specimens and the Law of Property, 4 ANGLO-
Am. L. REv. 412 (1975); Smith, Stealing the Body and its Parts, 1976 CRIM. L. REv 622
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specific body stealing statutes0 9 seem to refer only to unlawful ex-
humations"1 ° and would not be factually applicable, there are other
more general provisions prohibiting the abuse of a corpse.'1 ,
C. Fetal Possession-Specific Legislation
A statutory gloss has been added to this common-law position
on both sides of the Atlantic. In England the Anatomy Acts of
1832 and 1871112 are limited to immunizing donors and researchers
from any criminal liability for the donation, receipt, or possession
of a dead body. The common-law rights to possession of an unbur-
ied fetus as described above would constitute lawful possession for
the purposes of that legislation."13 It is by no means clear, however,
that a fetus, let alone an embryo, would fall within other qualifying
phrases in those Acts: phrases like "the body of any deceased per-
son" 1 4 or "any dead human body." 15 If the Anatomy Acts do ap-
ply, no offence is committed by the lawful possessor"' or recipient
of a fetus, as contemplated by either those Acts" 7 or the Human
Tissue Act," 8 which contains similar provisions concerning the
parts of the body.
In the United States legislation has been more specific. Arkan-
sas law prohibits the possession of an aborted fetus or fetal re-
mains" by persons other that pathologists, educational institu-
tions, and medical researchers.12 0 California regulates the storage
(arguing that the flexible concept of property could be extended to protect, via the criminal
law, possession of parts and products of unburied corpses).
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
109. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 701 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
110. Compare the charges against four researchers discussed by Culliton, Grave-Rob-
bing: The Charge Against Four from Boston City Hospital, 186 SCIENCE 410 (1974).
111. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (1962). The prohibition contained herein is
preceded by the phrase "[e]xcept as authorized by law." See generally Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d
1071 (1977).
112. The Anatomy Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, ch. 75; The Anatomy Act, 1871, 34 & 35
Vict., ch. 16. See generally W. FARNDALE, LAW ON HUMAN TRANSPLANTS AND BEQUESTS OF
BODIES (1970).
113. See, e.g., The Queen v. Feist, 169 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1858).
114. The Anatomy Act, 1832, § 7.
115. Id. § 14.
116. Id. § 7.
117. Id. § 14. For an unlawful receipt of body parts delivered for certain anatomical
research, see Regina v. Lennox-Wright, 1973 CaM. L. REv. 529.
118. Human Tissue Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 54, § 1.
119. ARK STAT. ANN. § 82-440 (Supp. 1985). The statute is worded in terms of "a fetus
born dead." Quaere, does the statute apply to the fetus born alive who subsequently dies?
120. Id. § 82-441 (Supp. 1985).
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of fetal remains, 21 and Indiana regulates the transportation of an
aborted fetus out of the state for purposes of experimentation.'22 It
should be noted that, notwithstanding the common-law possessory
rights recognized in a fetus, some American state statutes regulat-
ing fetal experimentation have refused to countenance any prop-
erty market model. Instead, intent upon discouraging the growth
of a fetus market, some legislatures have responded by derogating
from the concept of transferability123 with rules of inalienability.1
24
While not necessarily interfering with possessory rights, these stat-
utes do prevent the commercial disposition of fetuses.
125
In England, by contrast, The Peel Report announced no ethi-
cal or legal objections to the commercial use (and impliedly the
commercial disposition) of the placenta and retroplacental
blood.126 In general, however, Peel considered it unacceptable for
monetary consideration to exceed the "necessary costs incurred in
administering these services"'127 of supplying fetuses or fetal
materials.
Many of the issues concerning the possession and disposition
of dead fetuses are governed by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA).12 8 For purposes of anatomical donation, section 1(b) de-
121. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25957 (West 1984).
122. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985).
123. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30-31 (2d ed. 1977).
124. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-439 (Supp. 1985) (restricted to the product of a "legal abor-
tion"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (repealed 1984) (re-
stricted to cases of "induced abortion"); Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.026 (1985) (restricted to "live
or viable aborted child"); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, § 12J(a)(IV) (West 1983) (in situations potentially involving prohibited experimen-
tation); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1980) (in situations potentially involving
some nontherapeutic experimentation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422(3) (West Supp. 1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-342 (1979) (in situations involving any sort of experimentation); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14.02.2-02(3) (1981) (in situations potentially involving experimentation on
dead fetus); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982) (limited to "product of human
conception which is aborted"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735(A) (West 1984) (limited to
"resulting from an abortion"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(f) (Supp. 1985) (limited to experi-
mentation situations); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208(b) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-311
(1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977) (limited to live or viable aborted "child" for
experimentation).
125. See generally Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MIci L. REV. 1182, 1216-
37 (1974) (discussing the potential of a market system to increase the availability of human
tissue for research and transplantation); see also R. ScoTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 179-97
(1981); Carpenter, Ettenger & Strom, "Free-Market" Approach to Organ Donation, 310
NEW ENG. J. MED. 395 (1984) (letter to the editor).
126. PEEL, supra note 7, § 40.
127. Id. § 44.
128. UNIF. ANATOmICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983 & Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited
as UAGA]. See generally H. BERNARD, supra note 84, at 55-60. For a critique of UAGA, see
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fines "decedent" to include "a stillborn infant or fetus." Under
UAGA section 2(b), the donor of such a fetus may be, in descend-
ing order of priority: "either parent, . . . an adult brother or sister,
... a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his
death, [or] any other person authorized or under obligation to dis-
pose of the body.' 1 29 Several difficult issues arise with regard to
this donor class. First, the consent of one parent could be vetoed
by the other. 30 Second, like the English Anatomy Acts, section
2(b)(6) does not elaborate on the identification of "any other per-
son authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body," a
phrase possessing the same degree of certainty as baseball's infa-
mous "player to be named later." Therefore, such identification
must be made by reference to the common-law position. In McCoy
v. Georgia Baptist Hospital'3' the parents of the stillborn child
signed a release in favor of the hospital, relinquishing their claims
to the body and authorizing the hospital to dispose of the body as
it deemed advisable. The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that
the parents had "contracted away their 'quasi-property' rights in
the body of their child,"'3 2 apparently vesting such possessory
right in the hospital.
Finally, some state abortion laws may impact on this issue of
authorized possession of a fetus. For example, the Tennessee stat-
ute states that "[ain infant prematurely born alive in the course of
a voluntary abortion is hereby declared abandoned for purposes of
custody only and the department of human services shall care for
such infant . . . ."Is Presumably, upon the subsequent death of
Quay, Utilizing the Bodies of the Dead, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 889 (1984).
129. UAGA § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1983).
130. UAGA § 2(c), 8A U.L.A. 34-35 (1983), provides: "If the donee has actual notice
... that a gift by a member of a class is opposed by a member of the same or a prior class,
the donee shall not accept the gift." See infra text accompanying notes 354-74 (discussing
issues of consent and veto). In the case of divorced parents, see Phillips v. Home Undertak-
ers, 192 Okla. 597, 138 P.2d 550 (1943).
131. 167 Ga. App. 495, 306 S.E.2d 746 (1983).
132. Id. at 498, 306 S.E.2d at 748.
133. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-207 (1982). English law would not permit the warding of
a fetus in utero to prevent an abortion because that guardianship would upset the basic
termination entitlement envisaged by the Abortion Act. Cf. Note, Wardship and Abortion
Prevention-Further Observations, 96 L.Q. REV. 29 (1980); Note, Wardship and Abortion
Prevention, 95 L.Q. REv. 332 (1979). However, it might be possible for an English court to
exercise wardship jurisdiction over a live, pre-viable fetus ex utero to prevent maternal con-
sent to experimentation. See In re B. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (C.A.) (overriding wishes of
parents of mongoloid child and ordering life-extending operation); see also Note, Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority: Court-Ordered Surgery to Protect the Life
of an Unborn Child, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 83 (1984).
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such a live aborted fetus, the Tennessee Department of Human
Services alone would have donation powers under the UAGA.
The list of potential donees, including medical researchers and
accredited medical schools, is wide enough to deal with the experi-
mental interests considered herein.13 4 Additionally, the UAGA af-
fects the method of donating the fetus"3 5 and authorizes the donee
to dispose of the fetus following experimentation.'"
Of considerable interest regarding the potential for common-
law liability detailed above3 7 is the UAGA's statement that "[a]
person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this Act
...is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to pros-
ecution in any criminal proceedings for his act."' 38 This provision
has the effect of providing a donee with conditional immunity from
the common-law actions and offenses. This immunity is not partic-
ularly broad because it must be read as limited to issues of posses-
sion'39 and donation' 40 and will not extend, for example, to protect
a donee from liability for the intentional infliction of emotional
harm 1  or malpractice."'
V. FETAL EXPERIMENTATION
When considering the issues of disposal and possession dis-
cussed above, traditional legal doctrine at least provides an initial
analytical framework. The same cannot be said about issues raised
in the context of fetal experimentation. Although there has been
considerable academic interest in human experimentation and
transplantation, and specifically in fetal experimentation, 43 it has
been difficult to discover relevant general principles from which to
134. UAGA § 3, 8A U.L.A. 41 (1983).
135. Id. § 4(e), 8A U.L.A. 44 (1983).
136. Id. § 7(a), 8A U.L.A. 59 (1983).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
138. UAGA § 7(c), 8A U.L.A. 59-60 (1983).
139. E.g., id. § 2, 8A U.L.A. 34 (1983) (priority ranking of donors).
140. E.g., id. § 4, 8A U.L.A. 43-44 (1983) (mechanics of donation).
141. See, e.g., cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
142. H. BERNARD, supra note 84, at 58-59.
143. See, e.g., Hellegers, supra note 4, at 489; Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in
the States, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REn., Apr. 1985, at 12; Fletcher & Schulman, Fetal Re-
search: The State of the Question, 15 HASTmGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1985, at 6; Wilson, Fetal
Experimentation: Legal Implications of an Ethical Conundrum, 53 DEN. L.J. 581 (1976);
Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 STAN. L. REv.
1191 (1974); Comment, Fetal Research: A View from Right to Left to Wrongful Birth, 52
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 133 (1975); Comment, The Future of Fetal Research in California: A
Proposal for Change, 15 SAN DIGo L. REv. 859 (1978).
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deduce specific legal answers. The responses on each side of the
Atlantic have been characteristic of the two countries' different ap-
proaches to difficult medico-legal issues like abortion. In England
guidelines have been published, but the matter essentially has
been left in the hands of the medical profession. The United
States' legal regimes predictably run the familiar gamut, from de-
tailed, often poorly drafted state laws to leading-edge, constitu-
tional analyses.
A. Definitional Problems
Prior to considering the different regulatory systems that have
been instigated, some problems of terminology must be con-
fronted. 44 First, both federal and state regulatory provisions pur-
port to deal with fetal "research" 146 or "experimentation."' 46 It is
by no means clear, however, whether these provisions are broad
enough to police therapeutic fetal surgery. 147 Further, if the fetal
surgery technique utilized involves partial or temporary removal of
the fetus from the womb, 48 it is unclear whether this "experimen-
tation" is governed by in utero or ex utero regulatory regimes.
Although fetal surgery is still a relatively rare procedure, the
same cannot be said of prenatal diagnostic techniques like amni-
ocentesis. 149 Despite a district court description of amniocentesis as
144. See generally Horan, Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation, 22 VML. L.
REv. 325, 327-30 (1977); Labacqz, Reflections on the Report and Recommendations of the
National Commission: Research on the Fetus, 22 VILL. L. REv. 357, 361-66 (1977); Levine,
supra note 32, at 377-82.
145. "Research" is defined as "a systematic investigation designed to develop or con-
tribute to generalizable knowledge." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e) (1985).
146. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302A (1975-1984) (referring to "any medical
experimentation or scientific or medical investigation purposes").
147. Therapeutic fetal surgery techniques are detailed in Council on Scientific Affairs,
Division of Scientific Analysis and Technology, American Medical Association, In Utero Fe-
tal Surgery, 250 J. A.M.A. 1443 (1983); Henig, Saving Babies Before Birth, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 28, 1982, § 6 (magazine), at 18. Also examine the treatment of fetal death syndrome in
Romero, Duffy, Berkowitz, Chang & Hobbins, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 772 (1984). See also
Evans, Chrousos, Mann, Larsen, Green, McClusky, Loriaux, Fletcher, Koons, Overpeck &
Schulman, Pharmacologic Suppression of the Fetal Adrenal Gland in Utero, 253 J. A.M.A.
1015 (1985); Robertson, The Right to Procreate and in Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEG. MED.
333, 342-49 (1982); Ruddick & Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1982, at 10.
148. See, e.g., Fetal surgery outside the womb 'offers new hope' for the unborn,
Miami Herald, Mar. 11, 1982, at 23A, col. 1.
149. See generally Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
92 (1974); see also Cowart, First-trimester prenatal diagnostic method becoming available
in U.S., 250 J. A.M.A. 1249 (1983); Harvey, Boice, Honeyman & Flannery, Prenatal X-Ray
Exposure and Childhood Cancer in Twins, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 541 (1985).
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a "test" as opposed to an "experiment," 150 one state fetal experi-
mentation statute expressly excepts testing for genetic defects.'51
The implication is, of course, that the experimentation prohibition
otherwise would be applicable. A similar issue arises in the context
of fetal experimentation that "has gone beyond basic research into
the field of established practice in preventive medicine."'1 2
Finally, a problem also arises with therapeutic experimenta-
tion, techniques permitted by both the federal 53 and many state
54
regulatory systems. These provisions should be interpreted as
describing experimentation intended to benefit the fetus, rather
than applying only to successful therapeutic procedures. 155 In Eng-
land these issues are less pressing because an essentially self-regu-
lating model has been initiated. In the United States, however,
some of the regulatory models contain criminal sanctions. At the
very least, definitional problems may give rise to constitutional
challenge on the basis of vagueness.
B. Guidelines for Research in England
In 1970 the Secretary of State for Social Services appointed a
committee under the chairmanship of Sir John Peel to examine the
issue of fetal research. The report of this advisory group was pub-
lished in 1972.156 Unlike the National Commission's Report on Re-
search on the Fetus,1 57 The Peel Report was never intended to be
the basis for legislation. Rather, its purpose was to produce ethical
standards for the self-regulating medical profession 58 and criteria
for ethical committees considering research protocol.
159
Because the committee was "satisfied that the benefits to be
derived from the use of the whole dead fetus in the prevention and
treatment of disease and deformity are such that it would be a ret-
rogressive step to prevent it,"'160 Peel permitted the continuance of
150. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 221 (E.D. La. 1980).
151. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978).
152. THE PEEL REPORT, supra note 7, § 10.
153. See infra text accompanying note 179.
154. See infra text accompanying note 216.
155. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 219-20 (E.D. La. 1980).
156. THE PEEL REPORT, supra note 7.
157. See supra note 4.
158. "This code has no binding legal force but is the result of a careful consideration
of all relevant factors in the light of the available evidence. It is hoped that it will prove
acceptable to the bodies statutorily responsible for disciplinary matters in the medical and
nursing professions." Recommended Code of Practice in PEEL, supra note 7, at 12.
159. Id. § 4(iv)-(v).
160. PEEL, supra note 7, at 38.
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research on the dead fetus, subject to parental consent,161 provided
that:
"[diissection of the dead fetus or experiments on the fetus or fetal material
do not occur in the operating theatre or place of delivery; . . . [t]here is no
monetary exchange for fetuses or fetal material; [and] [ffull records are kept
by the relevant institution.
'1 62
Concerning the live fetus in utero, Peel's only restriction on re-
search was the statement that "[i]t is unethical to administer drugs
or carry out any procedures during pregnancy with the deliberate
intent of ascertaining the harm that they might do to the fetus." '16
Parenthetically, it should be noted that such research would be
subject to both criminal"' and civil liability.
1 5
Concerning experimentation on the live fetus ex utero, Peel
distinguished between the viable and pre-viable fetus. This appar-
ently unremarkable approach is noteworthy because the concept of
viability is essentially unknown in English law.166 Perhaps for this
reason Peel established a minimum, objective standard for deter-
mining viability at twenty weeks (or approximately 400-500
grams).6 7 Having set the standard, Peel prohibited experimenta-
tion on the viable fetus "inconsistent with treatment necessary to
promote its life."'08
In regulating research on the pre-viable fetus ex utero, Peel
differs markedly from the subsequently enacted regulatory regimes
in the United States. Peel permitted nontherapeutic experimenta-
tion on the pre-viable fetus. This research, however, is conditioned
on following both the guidelines for research on the dead fetus'69
161. See infra note 360.
162. Recommended Code of Practice § 3, in PEEL, supra note 7, at 12.
163. Id. § 5, in PEm, supra note 7, at 12.
164. If the harmed fetus were subsequently born alive, an offense would have been
committed under Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, §§ 18, 20, 47.
If the fetus were born alive, but subsequently died as a consequence of such research, then
murder or manslaughter would have been appropriate.
165. If the harmed fetus were subsequently born alive, an action would lie against the
researcher under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, ch. 28, § 1(1).
Quaere, what is the effect of the mother's consent to the research? See id. § 1(4), (7). Con-
sider also the abortee's possible malpractice action in the event that the experimented-upon
fetus were not terminated.
166. The English analog is "capable of being born alive," contained in the Infant Life
(Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, § 1(2). Presumably this was equated with
viability by the draftsman of the 1967 decriminalization. See Abortion Act, ch. 87, § 5(1).
But cf. Wright, Capable of Being Born Alive, 131 NEw L.J. 188 (1981).
167. Recommended Code of Practice § 2, in PEEL, supra note 7, at 12.
168. Id. § 1, in PEEL, supra note 7, at 12.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
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and the following additional criteria:
(ii) Only fetuses weighing less than 300 grammes are used;
(iii) The responsibility for deciding that the fetus is in a category which may
be used for this type of research rests with the medical attendants at its birth
and never with the intending research worker;
(iv) Such research is only carried out in departments directly related to a
hospital and with the direct sanction of its ethical committee;
(v) Before permitting such research the ethical committee satisfies itself: (a)
on the validity of the research; (b) that the required information cannot be
obtained in any other way; and (c) that the investigators have the necessary
facilities and skill. 170
Peel apparently was convinced that research into problems such as
the transfer of maternally ingested drugs across the placenta would
not otherwise be possible.
17 1
C. Federally Funded Fetal Research
In the United States fetal research formally is subject to two
regulatory regimes. First, research financially supported by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (Health Department)
must be in compliance with specific federal regulations. 12 Second
are specific state statutory provisions, which the Health Depart-
ment regulations expressly do not preempt.
17 3
The Health Department regulations were promulgated in re-
sponse to the 1975 report of the National Commission for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search. 17 4 The regulations contain general limitations on research,
such as providing a proportionality test to minimize the risks to
the fetus 75 and creating a "Chinese Wall" between the researchers
and those involved in any termination or viability determina-
tions. 7 6 In general, the regulations leave the issue of research on a
170. Recommended Code of Practice § 4, in PEEL, supra note 7, at 12.
171. PEEL, supra note 7, § 34; see also Beard, Justification for Fetal Research, 2 BRIT.
MED. J. 464, 464-65 (1973).
172. Protection of Human Subjects, Subpart B-Additional Protections Pertaining to
Research, Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and
Human in Vitro Fertilization, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Health
Department regulations]. For a summary of the regulations, see Friedman, The Federal Fe-
tal Experimentation Regulations: An Establishment Clause Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REV. 961,
970-76 (1977).
173. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1985).
174. RESEARCH ON THE FETus, supra note 4, at 33, 530-31. For background leading up
to the National Commission's interest in this area, see Lowe, On Legislating Fetal Research,
in GENETICS AND THE LAW 351 (1975).
175. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(2) (1985).
176. Id. § 46.206(a)(3). The regulations also prohibit offering inducements to termi-
nate a pregnancy to afford the opportunity for research. Id. § 46.206(b).
[Vol. 39:419
1986] EMBRYO AND FETAL EXPERIMENTATION 445
dead fetus or fetal material to the states.177 Research on the fetus
ex utero is conditioned on parental consent17 and is restricted to
cases in which the research would benefit the particular fetus in-
volved or the risk to the fetus would be minimal. 7 "
Concerning the difficult problem of the live fetus ex utero, the
Health Department regulations, at first sight, take a similar ap-
proach to the Peel recommendation. 80 If the fetus is viable, 8" it is
considered a premature infant, 8 2 and research is governed by the
general restrictions'8 1 on human research.' Research on a non-
viable fetus is limited to cases in which "[t]he purpose of the activ-
ity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which
cannot be obtained by other means."'' s5 The National Commission
had recommended that nontherapeutic research on the fetus ex
utero should be permitted only when, inter alia, "no intrusion into
the fetus is made which alters the duration of life.' 8 6 Under the
regulations as originally promulgated, however, different wording
was utilized:
No nonviable fetus may be involved ... in an activity ... unless: (1) Vital
functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained except where the
purpose of the activity is to develop new methods for enabling fetuses to
survive to the point of viability; (2) experimental activities which of them-
selves would terminate the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will not be
employed . .. . 8
Subsequently, the Health Department stated that the excep-
tion "did not adequately reflect the Department's actual intent,
simply to permit artificial maintenance of vital functions only to
enable the particular fetus 'to survive to the point of viability.' ,,188
177. Id. § 46.210.
178. Id. § 46.208(b); see infra text accompanying notes 364-66.
179. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a) (1985).
180. For a discussion of Peel, see supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
181. Research is severely curtailed until the viability determination is reached. 45
C.F.R. § 46.209(a) (1985). Also note that the objective weight criterion of 500 grams differs
from the English sub-300 grams requirement. See supra text accompanying note 170.
182. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1985).
183. E.g., id. §§ 46.401-409.
184. Id. § 46.209(c).
185. Id. § 46.209(b)(3).
186. RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 4, at 33,548. Commissioner David W. Loui-
sell dissented from even this limited position, stating that the Commission's position, de-
parted from "society's ... moral commitment" to "essential equality of all human beings."
Id. Louisell would reject any research that would "subject any unconsenting human being,
born or unborn, to [harm], even that intended to be good for society." Id. at 33,549.
187. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b) (1975) (amended 1978) (emphasis added).
188. 42 Fed. Reg. 2792, 2792 (1977) (emphasis added). In addition, the National Com-
mission had questioned the necessity for such an exception. Id.
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As a result, in 1978 the regulation was amended to delete the ex-
ception,189 thus severely curtailing research in the United States
compared to the position in England. As in other situations dealt
with in the regulations, the preconditions for nontherapeutic re-
search on the fetus ex utero may be waived by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.
190
D. State Regulation of Fetal Research
The federal regulations, when applicable, together with the
common law, provide the only specific controls over fetal experi-
mentation in half of the United States jurisdictions.' 9' The UAGA
has been adopted in all states and may be read as impliedly ap-
proving of fetal experimentation. This Act, though, is somewhat
narrow in its scope. The UAGA makes legal the donation of a dead
fetus 92 and the receipt of the same by certain researchers. 93 If
receipt by a donee is lawful, then presumably so also is the contin-
ued possession of the donated fetus. The UAGA, however, does not
state expressly that fetal experimentation is lawful.
194
Twenty-five states have enacted specific legislation dealing
with many of these issues. 95 At the outset, it should be noted that
189. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1985).
190. Id. § 46.211. The Secretary must obtain the approval of his Ethical Advisory
Board. Id.; see id. § 46.204(a); see, e.g., Ethics Advisory Board Approves Waivers for Fetos-
copy Research, 1 IRB: A REviEw OF HUMAN SUBJEcTS RESEARCH, Apr. 1979, at 8.
191. The jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.
192. UAGA §§ 2(b), 7(c), 8A U.L.A. 34, 59-60 (1983).
193. Id. §§ 3, 7(c), 8A U.L.A. 41, 59-60 (1983). Specifically, § 3 lists the persons that
"may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts thereof for the purpose stated."
194. Cf. Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the States, 15 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr. 1985, at 12, 13.
195. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36.2302 (Supp. 1975-1984); AiR. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-436
to -441 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25956-25957 (West 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 390.001(6) (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-26, -31 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (1985); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1983); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§
333.2685-.2692 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-108(3)-108(4) (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-342 to -346 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-a, -3, -5 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-54-1 (Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-
208 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
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some state laws, oblivious to the constitutional problems thereby
caused,' will apply only to the fetus who is or will be the subject
of an induced abortion. 197 A small number of state statutes, al-
though not so limited, nevertheless discriminate between induced
and natural abortions in the applicability of their regulatory
provisions. 98
As is the case with the Health Department regulations, state
laws have introduced special consent procedures for fetal experi-
mentation. 199 The states also have regulated the relationship be-
tween fetal experimentation and induced abortion. In some juris-
dictions this regulation has taken the form of prohibiting or
further limiting research on the abortus or potential abortus. 00
Other state laws have sought to regulate that relationship by
prohibiting the transfer of any payment or consideration from the
experimenter or the abortee that might encourage the abortion,
and hence fetal availability.20' Another simpler approach is to pro-
hibit the experimenter from taking part in the abortion decision.0 2
The states have considered four classes of potential experi-
mental subjects: the pregnant woman; the dead fetus and fetal re-
mains; the live fetus in utero; and the live, nonviable fetus ex
utero.03 The types of research dealt with may be labeled therapeu-
tic and nontherapeutic. The former is research subject specific, in
that the purpose of a procedure is to benefit the particular fetus
undergoing experimentation.
196. See, e.g., Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 675-76 (E.D. La. 1984) (noting
that drawing such a distinction makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, because it is
impossible for a scientist to distinguish induced and naturally aborted fetal remains).
197. The statutory language includes the following: Arizona ("induced abortion"); Ar-
kansas ("legal abortion"); Florida ("either prior to or subsequent to any termination of
pregnancy procedure"); Indiana ("aborted"); Kentucky ("live or viable aborted child"); Lou-
isiana ("born as the result of an abortion"); Nebraska ("aborted"); Ohio ("which is
aborted"); Oklahoma ("child resulting from an abortion"); Pennsylvania ("during the course
of an abortion"); Tennessee ("aborted"); Wyoming ("aborted"). See supra note 195. The
California statute refers to the "aborted product of human conception," which also may
refer to a natural abortion. For an example of research on a soon-to-be aborted fetus, see
Morris, Haswell & Hustead, Research in the Human Mid-Trimester Fetus, 39 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 634 (1972).
198. These states are Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Rhode Island.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 368-71.
200. See supra notes 197-98.
201. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)III (West 1983).
202. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-5(A)(2)(a) (1981).
203. Two other classes of subjects exist. First, the live and viable fetus ex uteio; this
subject would be considered a person and, therefore, would be protected by general human
experimentation regimes. Second, the embryo, which attracts a unique regulatory regime in
some states; see infra text accompanying notes 321-26.
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Of the state statutes that specifically address fetal experimen-
tation, only one regulates research on the pregnant woman. 0 It is
essentially similar to the applicable Health Department regula-
tion2 0 5 because the statute permits consensual research on the wo-
man when the risk to the fetus is minor or is necessary for thera-
peutic purposes.
As noted above, °6 the Health Department standards abro-
gated regulation of research on the dead fetus to state law. 207 Aside
from provisions relating to disposal20 and registration,0 9 only a
handful of states have grasped this opportunity.210 Of these states,
a few of them have statutory provisions that contain outright
prohibitions on research;211 at least one statute contains an implicit
approval of such procedures; 21 2 and others permit research only in
certain situations.213 The Tennessee statute goes so far as to pro-
hibit the photographing of an aborted fetus, absent maternal
consent. 14
Of the states that generally prohibit research on the live fetus
204. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-2 (1981).
205. 45 C.F.R. § 46.207 (1985).
206. See supra text accompanying note 173.
207. 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1985).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
209. See supra text accompanying note 62.
210. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302A (Supp. 1975-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-438
(Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (repealed 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns
1985); LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12J(a)II (West 1983); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3216(b) (Purdon 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (1982).
211. Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio contain the research prohibition but limit the prohibi-
tion to the products of induced abortions.
212. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West 1984) (excluding a "lifeless
product of conception" from the fetal experimentation regulatory regime).
213. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-2302A (Supp. 1975-1984) (prohibiting research on a
dead, induced abortus "except as is strictly necessary to diagnose a disease or condition in
the mother of the fetus or embryo and only if the abortion was performed because of such
disease or condition"); see also LA. REv. STAT. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)II (West 1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(b) (Purdon 1983).
The Arkansas statute, ARK STAT. ANN. §'82-438 (Supp. 1985), conditions research on an
induced fetus on maternal consent; however, it is difficult to see how such research could be
carried out because § 82-440 prohibits the possession of an induced fetus. Neither provision
applies, for example, to educational researchers. Id. § 82-441. Tennessee conditions research
on maternal consent. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208(a) (1982).
214. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208(a) (1982). The taking of photographs of dead bodies
is not generally regulated at common law. See Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275,
98 N.E.2d 286 (1951).
448
19861 EMBRYO AND FETAL EXPERIMENTATION 449
in utero,213 all of them exempt therapeutic experimentation.216
Concerning the live, nonviable fetus ex utero, state regulation
has been extensive, as benefits such a controversial issue. 217 Aside
from conditioning this research on maternal consent,21 8 the most
common provision found in these statutes is a therapeutic, fetus-
specific exception to the general prohibition.""9 Additionally, some
states make a specific exception for purely diagnostic proce-
dures. 220 A small number of states permit experimentation when it
poses only a minor risk to the fetus; this may be an alternate ex-
ception to the therapeutic procedures already mentioned2 2 1 or an
additional criterion.222 One statute has a general exemption for
educational research scientists.2 3
215. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6) (West Supp. 1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (repealed 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp.
1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)I (West 1983); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.2685 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
24-9A-3 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735A
(West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1
(Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978).
216. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978) (restricting experimentation to kenetic
screening).
217. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302A (Supp. 1975-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-437
(Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(6) (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)
(repealed 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West
Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. LAWS GEN. ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12J(a)I (West 1983); MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 333.2685k-.2686 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.422(1) (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-20-108(3) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-342 (1979) (prohibiting "sale, transfer, distribu-
tion or giving away" of such a fetus); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-4 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-01.2-01 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14(A) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
1-735(A) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
54-1 (Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977) (prohibiting sale, transfer, distribution or
giving away of such a fetus).
218. See infra text accompanying note 368.
219. The following states do not have the exception: Arizona (which provides for a
narrower exemption in the case of experimentation "strictly necessary to diagnose a disease
or condition in the mother of the fetus or embryo"), Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, and
Wyoming. See supra note 217.
220. These states include Massachusetts, Michigan, and North Dakota. See supra
note 217.
221. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422(2) (West Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1
(Supp. 1985).
222. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-4 (1981).
223. Arm. STAT. ANN. § 82-441 (Supp. 1985).
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E. Fetal Experimentation Regulation and Privacy Guarantees
Few of the fetal experimentation statutes have been the sub-
ject of constitutional review even though many states court danger
by including experimentation provisions in their more general
abortion restricting statutes.22 4 The specific issue was first ad-
dressed in Wynn v. Scott,22 5 in the context of an Illinois statute
providing that "[n]o person shall use any fetus or premature infant
aborted alive for any type of scientific, research, laboratory or
other kind of experimentation either prior to or subsequent to any
abortion procedure except as necessary to protect or preserve the
life and health of such premature infant aborted alive. 2 26 Impor-
tantly, the court noted that: "[t]he rights of medical researchers
are not fundamental under the Constitution, and are not entitled
to the derivative constitutional protection afforded attending phy-
sicians of pregnant women seeking abortions.1
2 7
Thus, for the district court in Wynn v. Scott2 5 and in the sub-
sequent Louisiana case of Margaret S. v. Edwards,229 the appropri-
ate standard for the purposes of fourteenth amendment review was
the somewhat less demanding "rational connection" test.230 Be-
cause of the deferential standard of review, the plaintiffs in those
early cases were unsuccessful. Yet, the most recent version of the
Louisiana statute has failed to satisfy even the rational connection
test, for in Margaret S. v. Treen, the district court could find no
legitimate state interest in according more protection to a dead fe-
tus than to a deceased person.23'
As a general proposition, the use of the less rigorous rational
connection test for reviewing experimentation regulation seems
224. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 638 (W.D. Ky. 1974), af['d in part and
rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (held invalid many of the provisions of the Ken-
tucky abortion statute, yet upheld the validity of a viable fetus experimentation prohibi-
tion). But cf. Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (striking down the entire
Utah abortion statute, including the fetal experimentation provision). Utah's revised fetal
experimentation prohibition is found at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978).
225. 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub.
nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'ing, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
226. The current, slightly modified Illinois provision is found at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
227. 449 F. Supp. at 1322.
228. Id.
229. 488 F. Supp. 181, 221 (E.D. La. 1980).
230. The rational connection test examines the rational relationship between the
means and ends necessary to satisfy equal protection and substantive due process require-
ments. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976).
231. 597 F. Supp. 636, 674-75 (E.D. La. 1984).
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supportable. As Justice Blackmun stated in Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth,232 however, "[t]he decision to abort ... is an impor-
tant, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative
that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and conse-
quences. ' 2 33 Some research on the pregnant women or on the fetus
in utero may be necessary to provide the women with full informa-
tion prior to making her abortion decision. If a state ban on fetal
research has the effect of denying the woman access to that infor-
mation, then the regulation will detract from her constitutionally
protected reproductive autonomy and will be contrary to the four-
teenth amendment.
The difficult problem that arises is determining exactly what
research is necessary to protect and, as such, will benefit parasiti-
cally from the woman's recognized fundamental right. In Margaret
S. v. Treen 34 the district court struck down a Louisiana statute
that provided: "No person shall experiment on an unborn child or
a child born as the result of an abortion, whether the unborn child
or child is alive or dead ... ."" In striking down this provision,
the court did not limit the woman's additional, constitutional in-
formation-gathering protection to the particular pregnancy during
which experimentation was performed (what could be termed a
pregnancy-specific rule). Rather, the court was of the opinion that
"[t]his statute unduly limits the medical information concerning
the likelihood of fetal deformity in their future pregnancies.
'236
Further, the court was of the opinion that "[t]he prohibition on
experimentation involving aborted fetal tissue is likely to impede
the thorough, complete pathological examination of such tissue,
thereby potentially endangering the health of women who choose
abortion.
'237
One could argue that this reasoning limits parasitic protection
of fetal experimentation to situations that will aid a particular wo-
man's informed reproductive choice (a woman-specific rule). Re-
search on any fetus, however, is as capable of benefiting any wo-
man's choice. Therefore, considering the court's extension of the
scope of the woman's privacy right beyond pregnancy-specific ex-
perimentation, it would be illogical not to protect all fetal research
232. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
233. Id. at 67.
234. 597 F. Supp. at 673-74.
235. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1981).
236. 597 F. Supp. at 673 (emphasis added).




Finally, although some state interference with fetal experi-
mentation may run afoul of the Constitution, the same is probably
not true of the federal regulatory system, based, as it is, only on
the funding power, 28 and given that parallels may be drawn to the
jurisprudence upholding restrictive government funding for
abortions.
239
F. Fetal Experimentation as Protected Speech
While it may be conceded that the fetal researcher seldom will
benefit directly from any fourteenth amendment privacy/funda-
mental rights2 40 protection,241 the same cannot be said for the pos-
sible impact of the first amendment free speech 24 2 and establish-
ment 243 clauses. Although some concern has been voiced that the
Supreme Court might adopt a conclusory characterization 24 4 of sci-
entific research as "conduct" rather than speech,2 '5 most academic
comment has postulated that research will be covered by the free
speech clause of the first amendment. 46
Of course, the determination that fetal experimentation is con-
stitutionally protected does not answer the question of the stan-
dard of constitutional review that the Supreme Court would util-
ize. For example, a prohibition on research involving a live, pre-
viable fetus would interfere with a necessary incident to free
238. See, e.g., Favre & McKinnon, The New Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry be
Bound by the Chains of Government Regulations?, 19 DuQ. L. REv. 651, 696 (1981); Fergu-
son, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639, 654 n.58 (1979);
Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
1203, 1267-77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research];
Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REv. 484, 506-10 (1979).
239. See cases cited supra note 34.
240. But cf. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 674 (E.D. La. 1984) (noting that
the researcher "is entitled under the Constitution to protection from arbitrary
infringement").
241. See, e.g., Delgado & MUllen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitu-
tional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REv. 349, 392-95 (1978); Favre & Mc-
Kinnon, supra note 238, at 707-27 (1981) (arguing that scientific research is, of itself, cov-
ered by "fundamental right" protection); Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research,
supra note 238, at 1213.
242. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
243. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " Id.
244. See generally L. TamE, AMERicAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 12-17 (1978).
245. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 238, at 649-54.
246. See, e.g., authorities cited supra notes 238, 241; Davidson, First Amendment Pro-
tection for Biomedical Research, 19 Amiz. L. REv. 893, 895-912 (1977).
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speech.247 This prohibition, acting as an indirect restraint on con-
stitutionally protected speech, would attract a balancing-approach
standard of review.246 A statute like this could not meet this stan-
dard because the state would have difficulty in showing either that
it had a substantial interest in protecting the bodily integrity of a
pre-viable fetus ex utero249 or that societal distaste for such re-
search would be a sufficiently important state interest.250 The con-
trary would be true if the scope of the state's regulatory system
were limited to certain preconditions for research, such as parental
consent or health and safety considerations.25 ' Similarly, a
nonvague212 research prohibition on the products of induced abor-
tionS2 53 would be valid because the same research could be per-
formed on naturally aborted materials.
A different first amendment attack on the regulation of fetal
research has been made on the basis of the establishment clause.
254
Specifically, it has been argued that the federal regulations "are
the product of an essentially religious dispute concerning fetal sta-
tus. 12 55 While it may be correct that the establishment clause pro-
hibits Congress from "choosing religion over science, '256 the com-
mon law's long, pre-abortion-debate history of concern over the
proper treatment of the dead and dying,257 however, will tend to
247. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 238, at 671-83. The authors also explore the
"speech plus" approach, which affords a lesser degree of protection to an activity that in-
cludes both speech and conduct. Id. at 683-84; cf. Davidson, supra note 246, at 915-16.
248. L. TRIBE, supra note 244, § 12-20; Favre & McKinnon, supra note 238, at 692.
One scientist has phrased the appropriate test as follows:
To test for the ultimate decision, whether to permit or to ban a particular line of in-
quiry, I would urge the criterion of a real and present danger. Note that the conjunc-
tion is "and" and not "or." It must be real and, besides that, it must be present. It
must be, in other words, of such a quality that you and I would willingly forego free-
dom of speech or of the press, were these the freedoms involved. We surely would not
consent to being muzzled merely to avoid difficulties. By the same token, we should not
close off a research activity because possible eventualities may be difficult to handle.
Stetten, Freedom of Enquiry, 81 GENxTIcs 415, 419 (1975).
249. Favre & McKinnon, supra note 238, at 695-701.
250. See Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research, supra note 238, at 1248-53.
251. Id. at 1253-59.
252. See discussion supra note 196.
253. See, e.g., supra notes 197-98.
254. See Friedman, The Federal Fetal Experimentation Regulations: An Establish-
ment Clause Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REv. 961 (1977).
255. Id. at 963.
256. Goldbert, The Constitutional Status of American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 11.
257. This approach derives support from McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 741
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub. nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). While discussing the
Hyde Amendment limiting federal funding of abortions, Judge Dooling stated, "On its face
such legislation, marking explicit disapproval of abortion in most cases, reflects a general
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support the finding of a sufficient secular purpose 258 lurking behind
the federal regulations. Further, in upholding the analogous federal
limitation on abortion funding, the Supreme Court has already
concluded, "[W]e are convinced that the fact that the funding re-
strictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, con-
travene the Establishment Clause.
'2 59
G. Fetal Research and Tort Law
In addition to the public law regulation of fetal experimenta-
tion, a narrow range of circumstances may give rise to civil liabil-
ity. As noted above, the researcher may face an intentional tort
action for experimentation without consent 60 or for insensitive be-
havior directed at a fetal relative.261 Additionally, the fetus itself
may possess a cause of action.
Four hypotheticals may be suggested. First, research is per-
formed on a live fetus in utero (or even a live embryo, prior to
reimplantation); the fetus is injured through the negligence of the
researcher and subsequently is born alive, but impaired. Depend-
ing upon the jurisdiction, the child should be able to maintain a
malpractice action for its prenatal262 (or preconception)26 3 injuries.
Second, the same situation arises, but the fetus is stillborn. In this
case, recovery would be dependent upon whether the jurisdiction's
wrongful death statute applies to a fetus.264 Third, the researcher
and long held social view. . . ." Id. at 741.
258. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 244, §§ 14-8, 14-9.
259. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980). In Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980), the district court struct down many provisions in the Louisiana
abortion statute on traditional Roe v. Wade grounds. The court, however, found no merit in
plaintiffs' establishment clause attack on the legislation. Id. at 224-25.
260. See supra note 80.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
262. See, e.g., Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, ch. 28, § 1(2)(b);
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
263. See, e.g., Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, ch. 28, § 1(2)(a); Berg-
streser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (Missouri law); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (Oklahoma law); Renslow v. Mennonite
Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977); cf. Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429
N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
264. See O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. 1983); cf. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.
3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977), overruled, Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.
3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978).
In England a survival-type wrongful death action under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 15 Geo. 5, ch. 41, could be maintained only if the fetus were
born alive and lived for at least 48 hours. See Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act,
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undertakes a consented to, possibly even fetus-specific, therapeutic
procedure. The risks to the fetus, however, are not adequately ex-
plained to its agent-mother. One of those risks occurs (without any
negligence on the part of the researcher) and the fetus subse-
quently is born alive, but impaired. A strong argument could be
made for permitting the child to bring an action for lack of in-
formed consent.1
5
The fourth hypothetical for consideration would be when the
researcher performs a diagnostic fetus-specific procedure. The re-
searcher negligently fails to diagnose the existence of a hereditary
defect and subsequently, the child is born alive, but impaired. An-
glo-American courts traditionally have applied the unfortunate
and inaccurate "wrongful life" label to the child's cause of action.
Moreover, those courts have interpreted the child's claim as a com-
plaint against allowing it to be born at all. Replete with the ideo-
logical baggage surrounding the abortion issue, compounded by an
inability to reconcile tort ("wrong") with life ("good"), 'most courts
have taken refuge in an obfuscating metaphysical debate over the
difficulty of comparing "existence" to "nonexistence" and have de-
nied the child's cause of action.266
If any unique label is required to describe the infant's cause of
action, the "impaired life" is a somewhat more accurate reflection
of this complaint. Far more important, however, is the need to con-
ceptualize the child's complaint as based on a lack of information
about the consequences of not agreeing to a particular medical
procedure;267 in casu, eugenic abortion. In reality, the mother is
1976, ch. 28, § 4. There is no English authority on whether the death of a fetus could lead to
a (nonsurvival-type) wrongful death action in favor of a relative, for example, under the
Fetal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act of 1976, ch. 14, as amended by
the Administration of Justice Act, 1982, ch. 53, § 3.
265. The only reported decision to this effect is Shack v. Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, 389
N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). For the action to be successful in England, the word
"occurrence" in the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, ch. 28, § 1(2), would
have to be interpreted as including inadequate disclosure of risk. On informed consent to
genetic screening, see generally Waltz, The Liability of Physicians and Associated Person-
nel for Malpractice in Genetic Screening, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 139, 146-49 (1976).
266. See, e.g., McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 890 (C.A.); Al-
quijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978, 473 N.E.2d 244, 483 N.Y.S.2d
994 (1984); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
267. See Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 27 165 Cal. Rptr. 308
(1980) (extending the concept of "informed consent" beyond the paradigm case of "failure
to inform of the risks attendant upon the performance of a medical procedure" to a "failure
to inform of the risks attendant upon the non-performance of some procedure"); see also
Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 1 All E.R. 1018 (C.A.); Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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the child's agent for receipt of information in matters concerning
its future health and integrity. The few courts that have begun to
grasp this concept have permitted the child's recovery, albeit lim-
ited,26 8 for its "impaired life. 269
VI. EMBRYOS: POSSESSORY RIGHTS
Most of the recent medico-legal comment concerning embryol-
ogy has focused on the capacity of in vitro fertilization techniques
to alleviate infertility and the corresponding legal problems.270 Yet,
the scientist's involvement with the embryo goes beyond assisting
its parents with procreation. There is considerable interest in em-
bryo research, and, for the most part, this research has taken place
in something of a legal vacuum. Indeed, some of the important reg-
ulatory regimes, such as the UAGA and the Health Department
regulations, apply only to fetuses and not to embryos.
A. Use, Disposal, and Possession
The existence of possessory rights over embryos 271 has been of
practical importance only since the perfection of freezing tech-
268. Typically, recovery has been limited to the special damages attendant upon the
child's extraordinary medical expenses rather than any general damages. There is general
agreement that the child's parents have an action for impaired (wrongful) birth in such
cases. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
Crucially, however, the parents' claim cannot include recovery for the child's pain and suf-
fering. A "backdoor" approach to such recovery would be to permit the parents to bring an
action for their emotional harm. Generally this claim has been denied. See Howard v.
Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 (1977); cf. Speck v.
Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 116-17 (Pa. 1981).
269. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98
Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983); see also Andalon v. Superior Ct., 162 Cal. App. 3d 600,
208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984).
270. Louise Joy Brown, who was born in England on July 25, 1978, was the first re-
corded "test-tube" baby, as the media persist in describing in vitro children. For a summary
of some of the issues that confront English law, see Davies, Close Encounters in a Test
Tube, 133 NEw L.J. 107 (1983). For a suggested blueprint for a United States response to
these new technologies, see Capron, The New Reproductive Possibilities: Seeking a Moral
Basis for Concerted Action in a Pluralistic Society, 12 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 192
(1984). For a statistically based account of the United States practice, see Curie-Cohen,
Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United
States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979); see also Cohen, The "Brave New Baby" and the
Law: Fashioning Remedies for the Victims of In Vitro Fertilization, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 319
(1978); Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35
Sw. L.J. 973 (1982); Comment, In Vitro Fertilization: New Territory for the Preconception
Tort, 5 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 169 (1982).
271. See generally Krentel, "Ownership" of the Fertilized Ovum in vitro: A Hypo-
thetical Case in Louisiana, 32 LA. BAR J. 284 (1985).
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niques (cryostorage) has made embryo storage more widespread.272
As a matter of practice, the leading in vitro group in England re-
quests both parents' agreement for storage of up to two years and
gives the parents the option of donation for research in the event
of nonreimplantation.273
In July 1982 the British government established a committee,
under the chairmanship of Dame Mary Warnock, to examine some
aspects of the developments in "human assisted" reproduction.
Questions concerning embryo possession and disposal also were
placed on the agenda. In its 1984 report, the Warnock Committee
(Warnock) recommended that frozen human embryos be stored for
a maximum of ten years274 and that within that period the couple
who stored the embryo should have the use and disposal rights.275
After that ten year period, those rights of use or disposal would
pass to the storage agency.
276
Warnock seems to have realized that one of the incidents of a
property rule is the right of alienability, thus raising the spectre of
a frozen human embryo market. Warnock, therefore, opted for the
quasi-property rights of use and disposal, expressly recommending
legislation to prohibit any right of ownership in an embryo. 277 War-
nock, however, did not go as far as recommending an inalienability
regime because the Committee was forced to recognize that "the
supply of human gametes or embryos might reasonably involve
some commercial transaction. ' 278 Warnock's solution was to pro-
pose that any sales be subject to control by a statutory licensing
body.2
79
A difficulty arises, however, concerning exactly how the par-
ents' rights of use and disposal are to be protected. Warnock left
open the difficult questions whether criminal sanctions would lie in
272. Embryos are cooled to -80 centigrade with liquid nitrogen. See Henahan, Fertili-
zation, Embryo Transfer Procedures Raise Many Questions, 252 J. A.M.A. 877 (1984) (re-
porting the presentation of an Australian scientist). On frozen embryo technology, see gen-
erally L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONs 256-58 (1984).
273. Henahan, supra note 272, at 879 (reporting the comments of Patrick Steptoe at
the 1984 Helsinki Conference).
274. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOL-
OGY, CMD. 9314, § 10.10 (1984) [hereinafter cited as WARNOCK].
275. Id. § 10.11; cf. Dickins, The Ectogenetic Human Being: A Problem Child of Our
Time, 18 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 241, 253-57 (1980).
276. Id.
277. Id. § 10.11.
278. Id. § 13.13.
279. Id. The committee recommended the creation of the licensing body in § 13.3 of
the report. Id. § 13.3.
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the event of theft of or criminal damage to stored embryos. Indeed,
both the Theft Act and the Criminal Damage Act apply only to
property.
280
A simplistic reaction to the inapplicability of property crime
laws would be to apply those criminal laws that protect "persons."
One then could argue that the destruction of a human embryo
would constitute the criminal offense of murder281 or abortion. No
prosecution, however, could lie for abortion under the English Of-
fences Against the Person Act,282 because the prohibition con-
tained therein is phrased in terms of procuring a "miscarriage." An
embryo could not be "carried" until after reimplantation. As for
the murder charge, the common law on both sides of the Atlantic
protects only "the reasonable creature in being. '283 Specifically,
the victim's body must be completely ex utero284 and must have
been "born alive. ' 8 5 At first sight these doctrinal preconditions are
met by the embryo in vitro. The courts, however, have elaborated
on this "born alive" concept to include first, displaying the usual
signs of life288 and second, no longer being "fetus-like. 287 For the
purposes of the criminal law, therefore, the live embryo in vitro
lacks any nominate legal protection, fitting within neither "prop-
erty" nor "persons" regimes. The role of the criminal law will be
limited at best to enforcing some statutory licensing system con-
280. See generally Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60, § 1(1); Criminal Damage Act, 1971, ch. 48,
§ 1; Matthews, Whose Body? People as Property, in 1983 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 193
(1983); text accompanying notes 96-105.
281. See G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 290 n.6 (2d ed. 1983); see also
Abel, The Legal Implications of Ectogenetic Research, 10 TULSA L.J. 243, 243-44 (1974)
(recounting the demands for a murder charge against an Italian researcher following the
death of a two month old embryo ex utero).
282. English Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 100, § 58.
283. See infra sources cited notes 284-85.
284. See, e.g., The Queen v. Sellis, [1837] 7 Car. & P. 850, 173 Eng. Rep. 370; The
Queen v. Poulton, [1832] 5 Car. & P. 329, 330, 172 Eng. Rep. 997, 998 (Littledate, J.). See
generally Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live-Birth, 20 L.Q. REv. 134 (1904); Winfield, The Un-
born Child, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 76, 79-80 (1944).
285. People v. Bolar, 109 Ill. App. 3d 384, 440 N.E.2d 639 (1982); cf. People v. Guthrie,
417 Mich. 1006, 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983). Concerning proof of "live birth", see Annot., 65
A.L.R.3d 413 (1975).
286. See, e.g., The Queen v. Poulton, [1832] 5 Car. & P. 329, 172 Eng. Rep. 997; Com-
monwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976), overruled sub nom., Common-
wealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984); Cordes v. States, 112 S.W.2d 943
(Tex. Crim. App. 1908); cf. The Queen v. Brain, [1834] 6 Car. & P. 349, 350 172 Eng. Rep.
1272, 1272.
287. See, e.g., The Queen v. Wright, [1841] 9 Car. & P. 754, 173 Eng. Rep. 1039; Re-
gina v. Enoch & Pulley, [1833] 5 Car. & P. 539, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089; State v. Winthrop, 43
Iowa 519 (1876).
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cerning embryo use and disposal.
Because criminal law is insufficient to protect the parents' pos-
sessory interest, a viable alternative may be to bring suit under
intentional tort doctrine. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital2 s a
medical facility working on an attempted in vitro procedure de-
cided to terminate its involvement and destroyed the blastocyst.
The putative parents brought an action alleging intentional inflic-
tion of emotional harm289 and conversion. The jury was instructed
on both causes of action, but found for plaintiffs only on the for-
mer. The judge specifically instructed the jury that they should not
consider the higher expectation of successful in vitro reimplanta-
tion and birth that had occurred for the first time between the de-
struction of the Del Zio embryo in 1973 and the trial date.29 0 The
jury may well have decided that the lower expectation of successful
reimplantation in 1973 had broken the causal chain of the Del
Zio's claim for unlawful conversion of their potential child.291 A
different result could be expected today.
B. Inheritance Implications
Warnock recommended that, upon the death of one of the
parents of a stored embryo, the use and disposal rights should vest
in the remaining parent.2 92 This proposal has important ramifica-
tions on the legitimacy of a subsequently thawed and reimplanted
embryo and on its inheritance rights. At common law, 293 a child's
legitimacy depended on his parents being married at the time of
the child's birth or conception. 2 4 Therefore, an embryo reim-
planted after its father's death would be legitimate. The in vitro
child, however, may not benefit from the usual presumption of pa-
ternity, based, as it is, on birth within the normal gestation period
288. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The case is described at length in Sweeney & Gold-
smith, Test Tube Babies: Medical and Legal Considerations, 2 J. LEG. MED., Apr. 1980, at 1,
and also is referred to in Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Hope for Childless Couples Breeds
Legal Exposure for Physicians, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 311, 321-23 (1983).
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
290. See supra note 270 (describing Louise Brown's birth). Louise Brown's birth dur-
ing the Del Zio trial added complexity to the case.
291. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 272, at 157 (theorizing that the jury permitted recov-
ery because of a belief that in vitro fertilization was possible); see also Cohen, supra note
270, at 331-32 (suggesting a negligence action for "wrongful destruction").
292. WARNOCK, supra note 274, § 10.12.
293. The many statutory modifications to the English common-law position are not
relevant to the issue herein discussed.
294. See Knowles v. Knowles, 1962 P. 161 (P. Div'l Ct. 1961).
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following conception. 9 5 Warnock also suggested that the date of
birth and not of fertilization determined the primogeniture is-
sue. 2 6 Therefore, any embryo not yet in utero at the date of its
father's death should not be considered the father's legal heir.9 7
If the Warnock recommendations are given statutory force,
English law will have a ready answer to the recently reported Aus-
tralian problem concerning the disposal of embryos. An American
couple had left two frozen embryos with a Melbourne hospital.
Both parents 298 died in a plane crash before implantation could
take place, leaving no instructions about the disposal of the em-
bryos. Following protests from anti-abortion groups, the Victoria
Parliament blocked the destruction of the embryos and made them
available for implantation in a surrogate, with adoption to follow
successful gestation. The Warnock approach would have left the
decision about the use or disposal in the hands of the hospital.299
Further, under Warnock, the English position would be to deny
inheritance rights to any child who survived thawing and preg-
nancy, an issue of considerable importance in the Australian case
because the American couple left an estate valued in excess of one
million dollars.00
VII. EMBRYOS: REGULATION OF RESEARCH
Warnock recognized that not all embryos produced through in
vitro fertilization eventually would be transferred to a uterus.
Therefore, the question then would arise whether research should
be permitted on nonimplanted (spare) embryos.301 Specifically, it
has been argued that the human embryo is a unique experimental
subject, particularly in the context of human fertilization, genetic
disorders,0 2 and cancer research. 303
295. See Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones, 1951 A.C. 391 (H.L. 1950).
296. WARNOCK, supra note 274, § 10.14.
297. Id. § 10.15. See generally Schuyler, The New Biology and the Rule Against Per-
petuities, 15 UCLA L. REV. 420 (1968); Thies, A Look to the Future: Property Rights and
the Posthumously Conceived Child, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 922 (1971).
298. In fact, the sperm had been from an anonymous third-party donor.
299. WARNOCK, supra note 274, § 10.12.
300. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984, at 9, col. 1; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1984, sec.
A, at 2, col. 5.
301. The Peel Report had defined "a fetus" for the purposes of its experimentation
guidelines as "the human embryo from conception to delivery (and therefore including what
is normally termed the embryonic state)." PEEL, supra note 7, at 2. Given that Peel was
issued in 1972, it seems unlikely that he meant to deal with research on nonimplanted
embryos.
302. WARNOCK, supra note 274, § 11.15.
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A. Proposed Regulation in England
Over strong dissents,3 0 4 the Warnock majority recommended
that embryo research be permitted to continue.30 5 However, War-
nock did believe that the in vitro human embryo should be granted
some legal protection, even if not coextensive with that granted an
embryo in vivo.306 Embryo research therefore would be conditioned
upon the experimenters' licensure30 7 by the regulatory agency
30 8
This experimentation would be prohibited beyond fourteen days
after embryo fertilization30 9 and could not include the implanta-
tion of a human embryo into a different species.3 10 All the condi-
tions would be backed by criminal sanctions. Finally, Warnock
suggested that no embryo that had been used for research should
later be reimplanted. 11
Nontherapeutic embryo research became an issue when in vi-
tro fertilization superovulation techniques led to the production of
"spare" subjects. A decision to permit research on these embryos
may not raise the ethical issues about embryo "farming" that ac-
company research on embryos specifically generated for research
purposes. The Warnock majority took the position that no distinc-
tion between embryo classes was necessary;312 in neither case
would there be reimplantation, and hence, the potential for life. 1
Clearly, however, the debate has not ended. At least one English
Member of Parliament has stated that he will introduce a bill
before Parliament banning all human embryo research. 4
303. See Henahan, supra note 272, at 882 (reporting on the proceedings of the 1984
Helsinki Conference).
304. WARNOCK, supra note 274, at 90-94.
305. Id. § 11.18. For some of the submissions made to Warnock on this issue, see
Brahams, The Legal and Social Problems of In Vitro Fertilisation: Why Parliament Must
Legislate, 51 MEDICO-LEGAS J. 236 (Fall 1983).
306. WARNOCK, supra note 274, § 11.17.
307. Id. § 11.18.
308. Id. §§ 13.1-13.14.
309. Id. § 11.22.
310. Id. § 12.9.
311. Id. § 11.22.
312. Id. § 11.30.
313. Id. § 11.28.
314. Fletcher, 'Horrors' at Embryo Experiment, TIs, Aug. 6, 1984, at 44; The Daily
Telegraph, July 21, 1984, at 7, col. 6. The only legislation that has resulted from Warnock so
far is the Surogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49, prohibiting certain commercial aspects
of surrogate motherhood arrangements. Two bills dealing with embryo possession (and both
entitled the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill) were introduced into the House of Com-
mons in 1985. The general effects of the bills would have been to prohibit the in vitro fertili-
zation of an ovum or the in vitro possession of an embryo other than for reimplantation.
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B. Specific Regulation in the United States
In contrast to the policing of fetal experimentation, the federal
regulatory system does not extend to embryo research.3 15 At first,
it appears that a number of state statutes do attempt to regulate
such research. In fact, however, most of these statutes provide for
regulation only after the state of reimplantation 16 This interpre-
tation stems from the use of qualifying terminology limiting the
regulations' applicability to "aborted" embryos,317 embryos "in
utero,"315 or "live born" embryos. 19 Some state statutes, however,
do apply to embryo research as it is commonly understood but do
not employ that specific term.32 0
Neither bill resulted in legislation.
315. The regulations define "fetus"-the subject of most of the regulations-as a post-
implantation entity. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1985). Embryos are covered only to the extent
that funded in vitro fertilization research requires Ethical Advisory Board sanction. Id.
§ 46.204(d); see Lorio, supra note 270, at 977-78. The Ethical Advisory Board has recom-
mended that embryos that would not be reimplanted should not be sustained for more than
14 days. Id. at 985; see Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research, 14 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 5, 1984; Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test Tube Ba-
bies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L.J. 1295, 1296-98, 1311-18
(1979).
316. See generally Blumberg, Legal Issues in Nonsurgical Human Ovum Transfer,
251 J. A.M.A. 1178, 1178-79 (1984).
317. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302A (Supp. 1975-1980). The statute provides:
"A person shall not knowingly use any... embryo, living or dead, or any parts, organs or
fluids of any such ... embryo resulting from an induced abortion in any manner for any
medical experimentation ... except. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The "induced abortion"
phrase should be read as qualifying both clauses in which "embryo" is mentioned. The Cali-
fornia statute prohibits most research on any live "aborted product of human conception."
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West 1984). The Ohio statute prohibits research on
"the product of human conception which is aborted." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14(A)
(Baldwin 1974).
318. For example, the Louisiana statute prohibits "human experimentation," defined
in part as "the conduct, on a human embryo or fetus in utero, of any experimentation or
study except to preserve the life or to improve the health of said human embryo or fetus."
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974) (emphasis added). If "in utero" is read as qualify-
ing "embryo" as well as "fetus" the prohibition extends only to post-implantation research.
319. The Maine statute prohibits, in part, using "any live human fetus, whether in-
trauterine or extrauterine, or any product of conception considered live born for scientific
experimentation." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980). Even if "live born" (defined in
§ 1595) qualifies only "product of conception," the only prohibition on "embryo" research
would be in the case of the extrauterine embryo that has developed into a fetus without
implantation.
320. For example, the Minnesota statute refers to "human conceptus," defined as "any
human organism, conceived either in the human body or produced in an artificial environ-
ment other than the human body, from fertilization through the first 265 days thereafter."
MINN. REv. STAT. ANN. § 145.421(2) (West Supp. 1985); see also id. § 145.421(3) (definition
of "living"). The New Mexico statute defines "fetus" as "the product of conception from the
time of conception." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1G (1981). The statute's definition of clinical
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Of the states that expressly regulate embryo research, 321 some
concentrate on controlling the supply and distribution of em-
bryos,322 while others have implemented a full regulatory regime
323
similar to that used for fetal experimentation.32 4 Pennsylvania has
chosen to emphasize the disclosure of research rather than its sub-
stantive regulation.325 By far the most interesting state law affect-
ing embryo research is contained in a 1981 amendment to an Illi-
nois statute. It provides:
Any person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum by a
human sperm outside the body of a living human female shall, with regard to
the human being thereby produced, be deemed to have the care and custody
of a child for the purposes of [the Illinois child abuse statute].32 6
A district court examined this provision in Smith v. Hartigan.3
27
Plaintiffs contended that the statute constituted a prohibition of
in vitro fertilization and was violative of several federal constitu-
tional guarantees.
328
The court, however, did not reach the merits of the case. It
decided that there was no justiciable controversy because the de-
fendant Attorney General interpreted the statute not to prohibit
in vitro fertilization. In fact, the defendants even seemed to con-
cede that there was a "fundamental right" to in vitro fertiliza-
tion 2 9 and that the only role of the statute was to protect "the
research, § 24-9A-1D, refers expressly to "research involving human in vitro fertilization,"
which is defined in § 24-9A-IK.
321. See generally Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction
Technologies, 70 A.BA. J. 50, Aug. 1984.
322. Both the Massachusetts statute and the identical North Dakota statute provide:
"No person shall knowingly sell, transfer, distribute or give away any fetus for a use which is
in violation of the provisions of this section [experimentation with some therapeutic, fetus-
specific exceptions]. For purposes of this section, the word "fetus" shall include also an
embryo or neonate." MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(iv) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983). The
Rhode Island statute is almost identical. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(f) (Supp. 1985).
323. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685-.2692 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.422 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-5c (1981).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 195-202.
325. The Pennsylvania statute does not prohibit experimentation on embryos, but
does set up a complex disclosure scheme for in vitro fertilization researchers. 18 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (Purdon 1983).
326. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
327. 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
328. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged violations of the first, fourth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 160.
329. Id. at 161. Presumably, the "fundamental right" was a fourteenth amendment
privacy right. A well-supported argument to this effect had been made by Flannery, Weis-
man, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 315, at 1300-11. See Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Pri-
vacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 263, 279-89 (1984); see also Robertson, The
Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEG. MED. 33 (1982).
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State's interest in human life by prohibiting wilful exposure of em-
bryos to harm [such] as by destructive laboratory experimenta-
tion."' This interpretation, tacitly approved of by the court, sug-
gests that whereas regulation of procreation-oriented in vitro
fertilization procedures will be subject to strict scrutiny, embryo
research regulation, like most fetal research regulation, 331 will at-
tract only "rational connection" scrutiny. It may be argued that
state regulation of embryo research is valid if limited to the regula-
tion of procedural issues such as parental consent or to considera-
tions of public health. 2  Beyond that, state regulation of embryo
research will be valid if it does not afford an embryo greater pro-
tection than a fetus or live-born viable child 33 and is not imper-
missibly vague. 3 4
Of course, some circumstances may be identified when the reg-
ulation of in vitro fertilization research will interfere with a wo-
man's reproductive autonomy and thus attract the strict scrutiny
review otherwise avoided. The Illinois statute specifically permit-
ted the lawful termination of a reimplanted embryo.33 5 A problem
arises, however, when an in vitro fertilization embryo is destroyed
rather than reimplanted. The defendants in Smith v. Hartigan ar-
gued that this nonreimplantation, and hence destruction, would
constitute a lawful pregnancy termination also covered by the Illi-
nois exception. 6
This characterization of embryo destruction as abortion cre-
ates something of a dilemma. The researcher attempting to use an
embryo for procreation purposes may utilize the woman's funda-
mental right of privacy if he does not proceed with reimplantation.
The researcher who never intends to implant a particular embryo,
however, is not so protected337 because, by definition, no procrea-
330. 556 F. Supp. at 161.
331. See, for example, the Wynn and Margaret S. cases discussed supra text accom-




334. See the plaintiffs' and defendants' arguments in Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp.
157, 160.61 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
335. "[E]xcept that nothing in [the child abuse statute] shall be construed to attach
any penalty to participation in the performance of a lawful pregnancy termination." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
336. 556 F. Supp. at 163.
337. This dilemma will concern not only the "pure" researcher, but also situations in
which a "procreating" researcher has fertilized several embryos, yet knows that not all of
them will be reimplanted. The Smith v. Hartigan court did not consider this issue because
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tion is being contemplated. The destruction decision probably
would not be at the behest of its "mother" and thus would not be
protected by Roe v. Wade. This raises the spectre of prosecution
for performing an illegal abortion when an embryo is destroyed.
The appropriate response to this problem would be to interpret
abortion laws as applying only after implantation and not immedi-
ately following fertilization.33 s
Aside from the threat of applying the general abortion laws to
aspects of embryo research and in vitro fertilization, recall that
some states specifically regulate these matters.33 1 In these cases,
problems arise when a researcher experiments on an embryo to de-
termine, for example, whether it will be born healthy. Whether the
research is performed on the specific embryo to be reimplanted
(pregnancy-specific), 4 ° or on a sibling embryo (woman-specific),341
this research may be afforded fundamental right protection. Ab-
sent this pregnancy-termination connection, however, the re-
searcher must construct a first amendment or fundamental privacy
protection for the research itself.
34 2
If the fourteenth amendment has the effect of protecting some
the plaintiffs were not contemplating any "superovulation" technique. 556 F. Supp. at 163.
According to Lori Andrews, the Boston District Attorney had considered that the Massa-
chusetts abortion statute would not be violated if all the fertilized ova were reimplanted.
See Andrews, supra note 321, at 50, 52. Yet the argument could be made that because the
superovulation technique may be necessary to promote successful procreation, then all as-
pects of that technique, including destruction of unused embryos, should receive fundamen-
tal right protection. See Lorio, supra note 270, at 973, 981.
338. The problem is similar to, and arguably the solution should be the same as, that
suggested by the debate as to whether some forms of contraception are in fact abor-
tifacients. For English law, see Tunkel, Modern Anti-Pregnancy Techniques and the Crimi-
nal Law, 1974 CRiM. L. REv. 461. For the situation in the United States, see MODEL PENAL
CODE § 230.3(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Meloy, Pre-Implantation Fertility Control
and the Abortion Law, 41 CHL-KENT L. REv. 183 (1964); Note, Criminal
Law-Abortion-The "Morning-After Pill" and Other Pre-Implantation Birth-Control
Methods and the Law, 46 OR. L. REv. 211 (1967). Compare New Zealand Crimes Act, 1961,
§ 182A (1977 amendment). See generally Potts, Postconceptive Control of Fertility, 8 INT'L
J. GYNAE cOLOGY & OBSTmmICS 957 (1970).
Obviously, the issue is not merely a legal-semantic one, but involves each individual's
psycho-philosophical responses to the indicia of life. See the continuum of views related by
Lorio, supra note 270, at 980. For both the value and limitations of the modern bio-sciences,
consider Milby, The New Biology and the Question of Personhood: Implications for Abor-
tion, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 31 (1983-84).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 321-25.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 236-37.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 240-59. The specific question of first amend-
ment protection for embryo research is considered by Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett &
Braverman, supra note 315, at 1325-29.
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forms of embryo research, the question arises whether other funda-
mental legal rights may have a contrary effect. English law,343 since
before the abolition of colonial slavery,344 has recognized "no right
of dominion over a living person as belonging to another. 3 45 In the
United States an application of the analogous thirteenth amend-
ment348 to curtail fetal or embryo possession or even experimenta-
tion is doubtful. 47 First, the Supreme Court generally has been
cautious about its own,34 as opposed to congressional,3 4 9 utilization
of the thirteenth amendment. Second, because state statutes have
not mandated embryo or fetal experimentation, there is no ques-
tion of state action here and the Supreme Court has been some-
what conservative in its application of the thirteenth amendment
to private action.3 50 Finally, the ban on slavery may be viewed as a
narrow precursor to the protection granted by the fourteenth
amendment;351 and yet a fetus, and presumably an embryo, is not a
person for the purposes of that latter, broader amendment.3 2 Un-
like the fourteenth, the thirteenth amendment does not use the
word person; nevertheless, its purpose may be seen as limited to
the protection of personhood, 53 and thus irrelevant to embryo and
fetal experimentation.
343. See, e.g., Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.D. 1772).
344. 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 73 (1833).
345. Mathews, Whose Body? People as Property, 1983 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 193,
223.
346. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United
States." U.S. CoNST., amend. XIII.
347. See, e.g., Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 802 (W.D. Va. 1981) (holding that
injured fetus, subsequently born alive, had no cause of action under the Civil Rights Act or
the federal Constitution).
348. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1970) (Burger, J., concurring).
349. The Court seems to take an expansive view of Congress' power under § 2 of the
thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1970); see also Cal-
houn, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Authority for Federal
Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313, 349-62 (1977); Note,
The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1294 (1969).
350. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895).
351. tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL.IF. L. REV. 171,
172-73, 200-03 (1951).
352. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
353. Of course, this does not dispose of the normative question of whether a fetus
should be considered a person under the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments. See Baron,
supra note 31, at 53-55.
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VIII. ISSUES OF CONSENT AND VETO
Roe v. Wade and the English Abortion Act may have deter-
mined the basic allocation of rights between an abortee and an
abortus. Neither of those basic documents of liberalized abortion,
however, expressly dealt with the potential involvement of the
other parties interested in the termination decision. On both sides
of the Atlantic, the courts have had to determine whether the com-
peting interests of fathers354 and grandparents35 5 deserve recogni-
tion. Legislative bodies have tended to deal primarily with consci-
entious objection by medical staff.3 58
Fetal and embryo experimentation creates similar problems.
3 57
The legislative response, at least in the United States, has been to
create a confusing, multilayered series of consent provisions. In
England, broad next-of-kin consent clearly may be derived from
existing common-law rights of possession.3 58 If the Anatomy Acts
(whole bodies) and the Human Tissue Act (body parts) apply to
the possession of pre-viable cadavers, then they provide for a pa-
rental veto.3 5 9 In addition, The Peel Report recommends that in
354. See Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Servs. Trustees, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 687;
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); see also Kennedy, Husband Denied a
Say in Abortion Decision, 42 MOD. L. Rav. 324 (1979); Lyon & Benett, Abortion-The Fe-
male, the Foetus and the Father, 32 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBs. 217 (1979); Note, Third Party
Consent to Abortions Before and After Danforth: A Theoretical Analysis, 15 J. FAm. L. 508
(1976-77).
355. See Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Auth., [1985] 3 All E.R.
402, previous proceedings at [1983] 3 W.L.R. 859; Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983); H.L. v. Matheson 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See generally Buchanan, The Consti-
tution and the Anomaly of the Pregnant Teenager, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 553 (1982); Note, Not
While You Live in My House: The Supreme Court Upholds Mandatory Parental Notifica-
tion of the Dependent Minor's Abortion Decision in H.L. v. Matheson, 13 TOLEDO L. REv.
115 (1981-82); Recent Cases, Right to Abortion Limited: The Supreme Court Upholds the
Constitutionality of Parental Notification Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REv. 281 (1982).
356. E.g., The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(8) (West
Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-33 (Smith-Hurd 1977); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112,
§ 121 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983); NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 28-338 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
306 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-106 (1977). For conscientious objection to fetal experimenta-
tion, see THE PEEL REPORT, supra note 7, § 43.
357. See generally G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATz, supra note 4, at 204-06; Horan,
Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation, 22 VILL. L. REv. 325, 333-38 (1976-77);
Quay, Utilizing the Bodies of the Dead, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 889, 895-96 (1984); Wilson,
Fetal Experimentation: Rights of the Father and Questions of Personhood, 22 VILL. L. REv.
403, 409-12 (1976-77); Comment, The Future of Fetal Research in California: A Proposal
for Change, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 859, 881-84 (1978).
358. See cases cited supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
359. The Anatomy Acts, 1984, ch. 14, § 4(3)(b) gives a veto to "any surviving relative";
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the case of fetal experimentation, a "parent" should have veto
power on any research.3 60 As to embryo research, the Warnock re-
port stopped short of recommending legislation but instead stated
that "as a matter of good practice no research should be carried
out on a spare embryo without the informed consent of the couple
for whom that embryo was generated, whenever this is possible."
36 1
In the United States a similar common-law position obtains.
Moreover, the UAGA has been adopted in all states. Although the
UAGA does not expressly apply to experimentation, it does affect
donations for the purposes of experimentation. Thus, compliance
with its donation and consent provisions will imply consent to ex-
perimentation. The UAGA's provisions, however, are somewhat id-
iosyncratic. Notwithstanding consent by the donor,3 62 the donee
may not accept the donation if he has actual notice of the contrary
wishes of another member of the relevant donor class.
3 3
Possession and donation aside, consent to fetal experimenta-
tion is regulated at both the federal and state levels. In the case of
federally funded experimentation, the Health Department regula-
tionS3 64 require that consent for in utero research be obtained on
an informed basis from both legally competent parents. The fa-
ther's consent, however, may be excused if: (1) his identity or
whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained; (2) he is not rea-
sonably available; or (3) the pregnancy was the product of rape. 65
For fetuses ex utero but still living, the requirements of consent
are the same. 6
When the fetus is not living or when fetal material rather than
an actual fetus is involved, the federal regulations defer to state
law.3 67 Only ten of the twenty-five states regulating fetal research,
however, even mention consent requirements. Of those ten, seven
require some type of consent by the mother but do not detail any
provisions for a writing or an informed judgment. 68 Of the remain-
The Human Tissue Act, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 54, § 1(2)(b) gives a veto to "any surviving
relative."
360. See Recommended Code of Practice § 3, in PEEL, supra note 7.
361. WARNOCK, supra note 274, § 11.24.
362. UAGA § 2(b).
363. Id. § 2(c).
364. See supra note 172.
365. 45 C.F.R. § 46.208 (1985).
366. Id. § 46.209.
367. Id. § 46.210.
368. ARK STAT. ANN. § 82-438 (Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(II)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2688 (1980); NJ). CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.2-02 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(b) (Purdon 1983) (written consent spec-
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ing three, South Dakota requires the written consent of the "wo-
man" and may apply to live as well as to dead fetuses.3 9 The New
Mexico statute mimics the federal rules in mandating a legally
competent mother's informed consent. It also defines in depth the
meaning of "informed consent."3' 0 Finally, the Illinois statute
alone allows permission for experimentation to be granted in writ-
ing by either parent.
371
Such consent provisions raise serious concerns in the context
of induced abortions. On the one hand, it may be argued that a
woman who has terminated her pregnancy, presumably with a view
to terminating the fetus, should be the last person permitted to
determine its future.3 72 Indeed, from the pro-life perspective such a
rule presumably would be akin to permitting a murderer to donate
his victim's corpse for anatomical study. On the other hand, per-
mitting any one other than the abortee to determine such an issue
would be both a factually and legally 373 impermissible burden on
the abortion decision. The same also could be said of any statutory
provision that not only permitted the woman to decide the future
of the abortus, but in fact insisted that she decide its fate.374
IX. CONCLUSION
One of the eternal verities of comparative research is that, de-
spite differences in jurisprudential approaches and the availability
of doctrinal structures, countries with similar socioeconomic struc-
tures and values will evolve similar answers to legal problems. Con-
cerning the issues surrounding fetal and embryo disposal and ex-
perimentation, not only are there great similarities between the
practical effects of regulation in England and the United States,
but further, each country has displayed dubious internal consis-
tency by modeling their disposal and experimentation rules after
their abortion laws. Thus, in England difficult questions generally
are left to the medical profession; there are published guidelines
but a minimum of detailed statutory regulation. In the United
ified); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-54-1(d) (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (1982).
369. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1977).
370. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-5c (1981).
371. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
372. This presumably is one of the rationales behind the Tennessee statute. See supra
text accompanying note 133.
373. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), aff'd sub. nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
374. See Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 at 669 n.27 (E.D. La. 1984); Margaret
S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, at 222-23 (E.D. La. 1980).
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States, multilayered, detailed regulation once again is illustrative
of a legal system bent on supplying a definitive answer to any and
all contentious issues that arise.
The differences between the two systems raise an important
question. Since many of the moral and legal issues involved proba-
bly never will be satisfactorily resolved in our pluralistic societies,
is it not preferable to recognize, as Glanville Williams did forty
years ago, that the real question that should concern us is "one of
the proper limits of the criminal law. 3 7 5 In the United States, the
detailed regulatory regimes that have emerged may not be immune
from constitutional challenge, yet cannot fail to chill the interest of
researchers.78s For some, such a prophylactic reaction to the per-
ceived changes lurking in our future may be reassuring. The Eng-
lish approach, avoiding as it does any categorical assertion of
"rights," does not please the antagonists on either side of the abor-
tion or experimentation debates. Rather, it involves the taking of a
calculated risk; daring to increase our scientific knowledge before
we regulate3 77 lest our new world be too timid.
375. G. WLLI=AMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRumIx. LAW 223 (1957).
376. For the impact of one regulatory regime, see Culliton, Fetal Research (II): The
Nature of a Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 411 (1975); Fetal Research (III): The Impact
of a Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 1175 (1975); Stetten, Freedom of Inquiry, 81 GENET-
ics 415, 419-20 (1975).
377. For the difficulties involved in determining what risks to run prior to undertaking
research, see Stetten, supra note 376, at 418.
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